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Public Fora Purpose: Analyzing
Viewpoint Discrimination on the
President’s Twitter Account
James M. LoPiano*
Today, protectable speech takes many forms in many spaces.
This Note is about the spaces. This Note discusses whether
President Donald J. Trump’s personal Twitter account functions
as a public forum, and if so, whether blocking constituents from
said account amounts to viewpoint discrimination—a First
Amendment freedom of speech violation. Part I introduces the core
legal devices and doctrines that have developed in freedom of
speech jurisprudence relating to issues of public fora. Part II
analyzes whether social media generally serves as public fora,
whether the President’s personal Twitter account is a public
forum, and whether his recent habit of blocking constituents from
that account amounts to viewpoint discrimination. In doing so,
Part II also addresses the applicability of the recent decision from
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors—wherein a
local county government official was held to have engaged in
viewpoint discrimination for banning a constituent from her
personal social media account—to the Knight First Amendment
Institute at Columbia University’s pending case against the
President for the same. Part III then suggests multiple approaches
*
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Entertainment Law Journal, Volume XXVIII; J.D. Candidate, Fordham University
School of Law, 2018; B.A. in English with Honors, and Cinema & Cultural Studies,
Stony Brook University, 2013. I would like to thank Professors Olivier Sylvain and Ron
Lazebnik for their thoughts and guidance during the writing process, and their patience
with my many questions concerning this area of the law. I would also like to thank the
IPLJ Editorial Board and staff, especially E. Alex Kirk and Jillian Roffer for their
encouragement, insightful feedback, and updates on the pending litigation against the
President during the publication process.
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INTRODUCTION
Since his inauguration on January 20, 2017,1 the forty-fifth
President of the United States of America, Donald J. Trump,2 has
used his Twitter3 account4 “@realDonaldTrump” to communicate
with constituents across the nation.5 Six months later, the question
arose whether the President’s frequent use of his personal Twitter
account rendered that account a public forum,6 and if so, whether
blocking constituents critical of him from @realDonaldTrump
amounts to viewpoint discrimination7—a First Amendment
Freedom of Speech violation.8
On July 11, 2017, this issue was brought before the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York in Knight
First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump.9 The

1

See Donald Trump’s Presidential Inauguration: Order of the Day, BBC
(Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38668834 [https://perma.cc/
FWZ5-WWY4].
2
See id.
3
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/?lang=en [https://perma.cc/K7RY-W3EL] (last visited
Feb. 2, 2017). Twitter is a social media website that allows users to share news, pictures,
messages, video, links, and other media by publishing that information to their personal
accounts with the service. See Paul Gil, What Is Twitter and How Does It Work?,
LIFEWIRE (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.lifewire.com/what-exactly-is-twitter-2483331
[https://perma.cc/G2S4-CAB3].
4
The Author uses the term “account” loosely throughout the Note to refer to a
particular Internet user’s customized webpage or website on a social media platform, as
well as their preferences and settings for those platforms.
5
See
generally
Donald
J.
Trump
(@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump [https://perma.cc/G6BT-2AM2] (last visited Dec.
14, 2017). See infra I.C.2 Section (discussing briefly the President’s @POTUS account
versus his personal Twitter account).
6
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 24, Knight First Amendment
Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 1:17-cv-05205 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2017).
7
See id.
8
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(“When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers
on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must
abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” (citations omitted)).
9
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 6. This case is still
pending before the district court.
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Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University10 (the
“Knight Institute”) filed a complaint against the President alleging
that he violated the First Amendment rights of Twitter users when
he blocked them from his “@realDonaldTrump” account.11 In its
complaint on behalf of those blocked,12 Knight Institute alleged
that by targeting those critical of him in “tweets,”13 and
subsequently blocking them, the President engaged in viewpoint
discrimination.14 While this case was still only beginning,15
10
About
the
Knight
Institute,
KNIGHT
FIRST
AMENDMENT
INST.,
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/about-knight-institute [https://perma.cc/848W-6TAH]
(last visited Feb. 1, 2018). The Knight Institute is academic legal group that commits
itself to research and tactical litigation aimed at protecting and enhancing First
Amendment rights in the new digital technology environment. See id.
11
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 6, at 24.
12
Seven plaintiffs are listed in the complaint. See id. at 3–4. These include: (1)
Rebecca Buckwalter—journalist and legal analyst—blocked from the President’s Twitter
account soon after reply tweeting that Russia won the White House for him, see id. at 17;
(2) Philip Cohen—sociology professor at the University of Maryland—blocked fifteen
minutes after reply tweeting the President’s photograph with the words “Corrupt
Incompetent Authoritarian” superimposed over it, id. at 18; (3) Holly Figueroa—national
political organizer and songwriter—blocked the same day she reply tweeted a photograph
of the Pope looking angrily at the President, with words stating “[t]his is pretty much how
the whole world sees you,” id. at 19; (4) Eugene Gu—resident surgeon at the Vanderbilt
University Medical Center and CEO of Ganogen Research Institute—blocked
approximately two hours after reply tweeting “[t]he same guy who doesn’t proofread his
Twitter handles the nuclear button,” id. at 20; (5) Brandon Neely—2003 Iraq veteran,
former Guantanamo Bay guard, and current Texan police officer—blocked the day after
reply tweeting “[c]ongrats and now black lung won’t be covered under #TrumpCare” in
response to the President’s tweet, congratulating Pennsylvania on the opening of a new
coal mine, id. at 21; (6) Joseph Papp—author, anti-doping advocate, and former
professional road cyclist—blocked the day after reply tweeting “[w]hy didn’t you attend
your #PittsburghNotParis rally in DC, Sir?,” id. at 22; and (7) Nick Pappas—comic and
writer—blocked the same day he alleged that courts are protecting us from the President
in a tweet replying to the President’s tweet calling the courts “slow and political,”
id. at 22–23.
13
“Tweets” are character-limited messages and posts that Twitter users publish to their
Twitter account pages. See Jonathan Strickland & Nathan Chandler, What are Tweets?,
Section of How Twitter Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://computer.howstuffworks.com/
internet/social-networking/networks/twitter1.htm [https://perma.cc/M9UN-9SGX] (last
visited Feb. 1, 2018). “Reply tweeting,” “reply tweeted,” and “reply tweets” are all the
Author’s reference to the Twitter function that allows Twitter users to reply to another
user’s tweets with their own messages and posts. See How to Reply to a Tweet on Twitter,
wikiHow, https://www.wikihow.com/Reply-to-a-Tweet-on-Twitter [https://perma.cc/
9672-G3HR] (last visited Feb. 1, 2018).
14
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 6, at 1 (“In an effort
to suppress dissent in this forum [Twitter], Defendants [Donald J. Trump, Sean M.
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another federal court decision was decided within the past year,
taking up the same issue as the Trump case, albeit on a
smaller scale.16
In Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors,17 a
constituent of Loudoun County, Virginia, alleged the Chair of the
Loudoun County Board of Supervisors (“Chairwoman”) violated
his First Amendment rights when she blocked him from her
personal Facebook account.18 The U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia held: (1) the Chairwoman’s use of the
account as a government tool rendered it a public forum; and (2)
the Chairwoman violated the constituent’s freedom of speech
rights because her motive in blocking him was to silence his
criticism of her and the government body she headed, in replies to
her posts on Facebook, wherein she invited her constituents to
speak on local government matters.19 The district court cited the
U.S. Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Packingham v. North
Carolina, as well as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit’s 2008 decision in Page v. Lexington County School
District One, for the proposition that the government can open a

Spicer, (former) White House Press Secretary, and Daniel Scavino, White House Director
of Social Media and Assistant to the President,] have excluded—‘blocked’—Twitter
users who have criticized the President or his policies. This practice [viewpoint
discrimination] is unconstitutional, and this suit seeks to end it.”); see also infra Section
I.B (explaining what viewpoint discrimination is and its importance as a First
Amendment violation).
15
See Knight Institute v. Trump — Lawsuit Challenging President Trump’s Blocking
of Critics on Twitter, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST., https://knightcolumbia.org/content/
knight-institute-v-trump-lawsuit-challenging-president-trumps-blocking-critics-twitter
[https://perma.cc/9RZU-KECV] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (showing progress of
litigation timeline and latest major action as “White House’s summary judgment motion
to dismiss the lawsuit” on October 13, 2017).
16
See infra notes 17–22 and accompanying text.
17
267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017).
18
See id. at 706.
19
See id. at 716–17 (“[T]he record demonstrates that Defendant engaged in viewpoint
discrimination by banning Plaintiff from her Facebook page.”). The defendant’s motive
in banning constituents can be all-important in a viewpoint discrimination claim given
that viewpoint discrimination requires one to censor speech on the basis of viewpoint,
rather than some other criteria, such as relevance, content, or inappropriateness. See infra
Section I.B.1 for a full discussion of viewpoint discrimination related to other applicable
free speech doctrine.
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public forum on a social media site.20 Having found the
Chairwoman’s Facebook account was rendered a public forum, the
district court held that by blocking her constituent’s critical
viewpoint of her administration in that public forum, she had
violated that constituent’s First Amendment rights.21 Similarly, the
President blocked constituents from his personal social media
platform for criticizing him and his administration.22 In light of
this, the Davison decision now begs the question whether the same
result could be obtained when the defendant is, rather than a
county politician, none other than the President.
The issue of politicians blocking users is not limited to the
Davison and Trump cases. Currently, there is a host of complaints
lodged against politicians that blocked Internet users from their
social media accounts. For example, Kentucky Governor Matt
Bevin, Maine Governor Paul LePage, Maryland Governor Larry
Hogan, and Miami Beach Mayor Philip Levine, were all recently
sued for blocking constituents from either their Facebook or
Twitter accounts.23 At the heart of these complaints is the same
question addressed in Davison and pending in Trump: Whether
social media accounts generally serve as public fora,24 and if so,

20

See Davison, 267 F. Supp. at 716.
See id. at 71617.
22
The President does not contest that he blocked the Knight Institute case plaintiffs
because they criticized him on Twitter. See Stipulation at 1, Knight First Amendment
Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-05205 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017).
23
See Natt Garun, ACLU Sues Maine’s Governor for Deleting Facebook Comments
and Blocking Users, VERGE (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/8/
16114636/aclu-lawsuit-maine-governor-facebook-blocking-deleting-comments-freespeech [https://perma.cc/4L2L-5S5P]; Brittany Shammas, Miami Beach Mayor Philip
Levine Sued for Blocking Critics on Social Media, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016),
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/miami-beach-mayor-philip-levine-sued-forblocking-critics-on-social-media-8837410 [https://perma.cc/CD8R-N9CP]; Morgan
Watkins & Phillip M. Bailey, Kentuckians Sue Gov. Matt Bevin for Blocking Them on
Twitter and Facebook, COURIER J. (July 31, 2017), http://www.courier-journal.com/story/
news/2017/07/31/kentuckians-sue-gov-matt-bevin-blocking-them-twitter-and-facebook/
519427001/ [https://perma.cc/ZT3Y-KPJX]; Brian Witte, ACLU Sues Maryland
Governor Over Social Media Blocking, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2017),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/maryland/articles/2017-08-01/aclu-suesmaryland-governor-over-social-media-blocking [https://perma.cc/5JN6-GQE9].
24
The term “fora” is used throughout this Note as the plural form of the word “forum.”
21
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whether blocking constituents from a government official’s
account is a violation of those constituents’ freedom of speech.25
Considering the current combative political climate on social
media,26 how meritorious are these claims against the President?
Barack Obama’s successful election as the forty-fourth President
of the United States was famously attributed, at least in part, to his
skillful use of the social media platform Facebook to get his
message across to online audiences.27 His use of his own Facebook
account to deliver political posts about his candidacy across the
Internet seemed to mark the beginning of this now-popular trend
among candidates for political office.28 Similarly, the current
25
Compare Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 6, at 1–2, 24,
and Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716–17, with Garun, supra note 23, Shammas, supra
note 23, Watkins & Bailey, supra note 23, and Witte, supra note 23.
26
Social media has arguably enflamed divisiveness in contemporary American politics
between the left and right of the political spectrum. For example, Harvard’s Berkman
Klein Center found that “[d]isproportionate popularity on Facebook is a strong indicator
of highly partisan and unreliable media.” ROBERT FARIS ET AL., BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR
INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARVARD UNIV., RESEARCH PUB. NO. 2017-6, PARTISANSHIP,
PROPAGANDA, AND DISINFORMATION: ONLINE MEDIA AND THE 2016 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION 15 (2017). This seems to indicate that the most widely shared and liked
political posts on Facebook cater to extreme or exaggerated political information and
viewpoints. See id. Corroborating this notion, in 2016, the Pew Research Center found
“[m]ore than one-third of social media users are worn out by the amount of political
content they encounter, and more than half describe their online interactions with those
they disagree with politically as stressful and frustrating.” MAEVE DUGGAN & AARON
SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA 3 (2016). If
more than one-third of social media users are worn out by the volume of political content
they see on social media, it stands to reason that the volume of political content on social
media is substantial. See id. The fact that more than half of social media users are
frustrated by disagreements in casual online political discourse shows how emotionally
charged these disagreements really are. See id.
27
See David Carr, How Obama Tapped into Social Network’s Power, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 9, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/10carr.html
[https://perma.cc/78U4-Y9VB]. See generally Jennifer Aaker & Victoria Chang, Obama
and the Power of Social Media and Technology, EUR. BUS. REV., May–June 2010, at 16–
21,
https://people.stanford.edu/jaaker/sites/default/files/tebrmay-june-obama.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XAR8-TMPE] (explaining how Obama’s innovative approach to
campaigning through social media and email campaigns benefitted his election).
28
See, e.g., Aaker & Chang, supra note 27, at 20 (“Obama changed the way elections
were run and would be run in the future. He and his team showed the power of social
media and technology . . . .”); Madeline McDowell, Does Twitter Play Too Much of a
Role in the Presidential Election?, LOYOLA UNIV. OF MD.: EMERGING MEDIA 360 (2016),
https://www.loyola.edu/academics/emerging-media/blog/2016/twitters-role-inpresidential-election [https://perma.cc/HLQ5-Q7LG] (stating “[w]hen Barack Obama
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President famously leveraged the use of his own Twitter account to
“go viral”29 during the election for the forty-fifth president—a
tactic that the President himself attributed to his overall success in
getting himself elected.30
Today, political candidates, both state and federal, from county
supervisor, to mayor, to governor, to congresswomen and
congressmen, to senators, and presidents, leverage social media to
better connect with their constituents.31 They would be crazy not
to. After all, a huge amount of American political discourse and
debate takes place across the Internet today.32 Citizens comment
back and forth on each other’s accounts about their views and
arguments concerning trending political topics.33 Research
indicates that political debates and propaganda on social media are
to blame for deepened political divineness among the general
first ran for President in 2008, utilizing social media as a candidate was not totally
unheard of, but absolutely not being used as it is now”).
29
To “go viral” means “[i]f a video, image, or story . . . spreads quickly and widely on
the Internet through social media and e-mail.” Definition of ‘Go Viral’,
COLLINSDICTIONARY.COM, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/go-viral
[https://perma.cc/C2WN-9RWZ] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
30
See Chris Baynes, Donald Trump Says He Would Not Be President Without Twitter,
INDEPENDENT (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/uspolitics/donald-trump-tweets-twitter-social-media-facebook-instagram-fox-businessnetwork-would-not-be-a8013491.html [https://perma.cc/AB46-B5CZ] (“[The President]
said: ‘I doubt I would be here if it weren’t for social media, to be honest with you . . . .
Tweeting is like a typewriter – when I put it out, you put it immediately on your
show.[’]” (quoting Donald J. Trump)). Scholarship agrees with the President. See, e.g.,
Jacob Marx, Twitter and the 2016 Presidential Election, CRITIQUE: A WORLDWIDE J.
STUDENT POL., Spring 2017, at 34 (arguing that “Twitter was instrumental in [the
President’s] successful run”); McDowell, supra note 28 (“Twitter can be seen as a way to
connect with a candidate just as you’d connect with a friend, it shows and helps maintain
the authenticity behind a candidate. In the midst of a social media revolution, the social
media departments behind a candidate are studying memes and how to fit a response into
140 characters.”).
31
See, e.g., How Congress Used Social Media in 2017, QUORUM (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.quorum.us/data-driven-insights/congress-on-social-media-2017/192/
[https://perma.cc/G58C-WFZ4] (“This year the 535 members of Congress have
collectively posted over [one] million times on social media platforms like Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, Medium, and YouTube.”); supra notes 23–25 and
accompanying text.
32
See generally DUGGAN & SMITH, supra note 26 (discussing the voluminous political
interactions that take place between those with different political viewpoints on
social media).
33
See id. at 2–3.
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American public,34 with some stating that such divisiveness has
reached a level not seen since the Civil War.35 Further, the
organization of rallies and protests have evolved rapidly on social
media, with citizens creating private and public groups36 to
introduce, share, and discuss their ongoing political agendas.37
Political movements, such as “Black Lives Matter,”38 and the
counter-movements “All Lives Matter”39 and “Blue Lives
Matter,”40 have social media in part to thank for their successes in
reaching the mainstream media and the general public.41
Unpopular views among isolated pockets of constituents, separated
34

See AMY MITCHELL ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION & MEDIA
HABITS: FROM FOX NEWS TO FACEBOOK, HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES KEEP UP
WITH POLITICS 1–2 (2014).
35
See, e.g., Conor Lynch, America May Be More Divided Now than at Any Time Since
the Civil War, SALON (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.salon.com/2017/10/14/america-maybe-more-divided-now-than-at-any-time-since-the-civil-war/
[https://perma.cc/WWU9-64UU].
36
“Groups” are generally virtual communities that enlist members on social media; by
“public” groups, the Author is referring to those that allow open membership, and by
“private” groups, the Author is referring to those that allow membership through
invitation only. See Heidi Thorne, What Are Social Media Groups?, TURBOFUTURE.COM
(Dec. 14, 2017), https://turbofuture.com/internet/What-are-Social-Media-Groups
[https://perma.cc/CWC6-VXDL].
37
See generally, e.g., Jose Marichal, Political Facebook Groups: Micro-Activism and
the Digital Front Stage, FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 2, 2013), http://firstmonday.org/article/
view/4653/3800 [https://perma.cc/ZFQ8-MWBD] (going into detail about political
activism through Facebook groups and how those groups organize and execute
their agendas).
38
Black Lives Matter, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/BlackLivesMatter/
[https://perma.cc/MT29-NZ83] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018) (showing 321,675 users follow
this account for updates); Black Lives Matter (@Blklivesmatter), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/blklivesmatter?lang=en [https://perma.cc/3R65-Y4FM] (last visited
Apr. 1, 2018) (showing 285,609 users follow this account for updates).
39
All Lives Matter Foundation, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
alllivesmatterfoundation/ [https://perma.cc/49Z2-NH8N] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018)
(showing 3,948 users follow this account for updates); #alllivesmatter, TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/hashtag/alllivesmatter [https://perma.cc/9A8H-NR48] (last visited
Apr. 1, 2018).
40
Blue
Lives
Matter,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/bluematters/
[https://perma.cc/SR67-L5ET] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018) (showing 2,000,715 users
follow this account for updates); Blue Lives Matter (@bluelivesmtr), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/bluelivesmtr?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr
%5Eauthor [https://perma.cc/2P5W-Y2Q3] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018) (showing 34,518
users follow this account for updates).
41
See supra notes 38–40.
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by thousands of miles or overseas, can now connect with each
other painlessly across the Internet and band together to
disseminate their viewpoints.42 Social media now provides a
platform for all views to be expressed—it presses to every political
camp’s lips, no matter how minor, a digital megaphone for
speakers to blast their viewpoints across endless and international
“market squares” of the Internet.43 Even the ongoing federal
investigation into Russia’s involvement with the President’s
election has social media as its birthplace,44 where so-called “fake
news”45 was allegedly spread about political candidates running for
office.46 All this is to say, social media has ingrained itself into the
very fabric of American politics, and to ignore the part it plays
there is to do social media a great disservice.
Until the Supreme Court weighs in, it is unclear how claims of
viewpoint discrimination on government officials’ social media
accounts will shape future First Amendment jurisprudence.
Additionally, until the Southern District of New York decides the
Trump case, which could possibly then go up on appeal to the U.S.
42

See The Internet: Bringing People Together Virtually or Pushing Them Away
Physically, STANFORD UNIV., https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs181/projects/200001/personal-lives/debate.html [https://perma.cc/YBR7-3WB7] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
43
See supra notes 32–33, 36–42 and accompanying text.
44
See Indictment at 3, United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, No. 1:18-cr00032-DLF (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018) (“Beginning as early as 2014, Defendant
ORGANIZATION began operations to interfere with the U.S. political system, including
the 2016 U.S. presidential election . . . . Defendants, posing as U.S. persons and creating
false U.S. personas, operated social media pages and groups designed to attract U.S.
audiences. These groups and pages, which addressed divisive U.S. political and social
issues, falsely claimed to be controlled by U.S. activists when, in fact, they were
controlled by Defendants.”).
45
“Fake news” is a term that has become increasingly popular following Donald J.
Trump’s election to the presidential seat. See Cristiano Lima, Poll: [Seventy-Seven]
Percent Say Major News Outlets Report ‘Fake News’, POLITICO (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/02/poll-fake-news-494421
[https://perma.cc/9HSK-LW3Q]. “Fake news” means many things to different people, but
essentially boils down to media reporting that spreads misinformation or misleading
coverage based on an underlying political agenda. See id.
46
See Indictment, supra note 44, at 4 (“Defendant ORGANIZATION had a strategic
goal to sow discord in the U.S. political system, including the 2016 U.S. presidential
election. Defendants posted derogatory information about a number of candidates, and by
early to mid-2016, Defendants’ operations included supporting the presidential campaign
of then-candidate Donald J. Trump (‘Trump Campaign’) and disparaging
Hillary Clinton.”).

2018]

PUBLIC FORA PURPOSE

521

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decides the pending Davison
appeal,47 we must wait and see if the two cases will eventually set
the stage for a new circuit split on the issue.
Social media has inescapably wedged itself into the annals of
history: It is used by a majority of Americans,48 and forms the
basis for an untold number of social and cultural commentary and
discussions on topics ranging from what one ate for dinner the
night before,49 to what parks and streets a local protest is going to
occur in that weekend.50 Social media has revitalized the political
landscape and, further, reshaped that landscape to reflect the
technology of the modern era.51 This is so much so that now at
least forty-six states’ governors have savvied up and begun to use
Twitter to connect more with their constituents.52
In analyzing these issues, Part I of this Note opens with an
introduction to the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of
speech, and then explores the various protections and exceptions
that shape how the law interacts with this freedom in government
or state-sponsored public spaces. Next, Part II discusses, first,
whether social media overall generally serve as public fora.
47
Both the Chairwoman and constituent appealed the decision of the Eastern District
of Virginia. See Case Docket No. 1:16-CV-00932-JCC-IDD, available at Westlaw.
48
See Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/
[https://perma.cc/3KNP-WWSN]
(noting that sixty-seven percent of Americans use at least some social media).
49
See Aleksandra Atanasova, The Psychology of Foodstagramming, SOCIAL MEDIA
TODAY (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/social-networks/psychologyfoodstagramming [https://perma.cc/DXA6-AWQF] (“Data from digital marketing agency
360i shows that [twenty-five percent] of food photos are motivated by the need to
document our day for the public.”).
50
Cf. The Role of Social Media in Accelerating a Revolution, SOL PRICE SCH. PUB.
POL’Y, https://publicadmin.usc.edu/resources/infographics/the-role-of-social-media-inaccelerating-a-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/WK89-A8T5] (last visited Apr. 17, 2018)
(“Participants and planners use social sites like Twitter to spread the word about
upcoming protests, making it easier to gain supporters.”).
51
See generally id. (discussing how social media users have integrated social
platforms into their political routines and education).
52
By 2013, the only states whose governors were not on Twitter were Indiana, North
Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Jimmy Daly & Anita Ferrer, Social Leaders:
The Complete List of State Governors on Twitter, STATETECH (Jan. 16, 2013),
https://statetechmagazine.com/article/2013/01/complete-list-state-governors-twitter
[https://perma.cc/3KNJ-39C5].
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Second, Part II analyzes whether the President’s personal Twitter
account serves as a public forum. Part II then continues to discuss
whether, if in fact the President’s personal Twitter account serves
as a public forum, the President can violate the First Amendment
by banning constituents critical of him from that account. Part II
finally concludes with how the Davison court’s analysis,
concerning a county politician’s similar action, cannot be
replicated to fit the Trump case, although the factors it enunciated
in its decision remain applicable. Finally, in Part III, the Author
provides several suggestions for hurdling the analytical divide
between the Davison case’s analysis and the approach the Trump
case must take when answering the question whether the President
acted in his governmental, rather than personal, capacity when he
blocked constituents from his account.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE: A QUESTION OF
SPEAKER AND SPACES
This Part explores First Amendment freedom of speech
jurisprudence as it applies to public and personal or private
spaces.53 Specifically, it examines free speech’s metamorphosis
into a shield against a concept called “viewpoint discrimination.”54
It then explains the public forum doctrine and the differences
between traditional public fora, designated public fora, limited
public fora, and nonpublic fora. Next, it highlights the various
limitations on freedom of speech, including reasonable time, place,
or manner restrictions, speech with little to no social value, and the
53

The Author refers to the terms “space,” “public,” “personal,” and “private”
throughout this Note. In doing so, the Author is using his own definitions: “Space” is
used in the sense of both the physical (i.e., spaces that a person can physically enter their
body into) and metaphysical (i.e., spaces that are digital or two-dimensional); “public”
spaces are those that are opened for the purpose of general public use by either a
governmental or private body (e.g., parks, streets, campuses, newspapers, social media
platforms, etc.); “personal” spaces are those that belong to a private person or entity and
are by default reserved to the use of that person or entity, but which from time to time
may be opened to the public; “private” spaces are those that belong to a private person or
entity and are decidedly reserved to the use of that person or entity, with individual
exceptions made occasionally for other private persons or entities to use that space after
securing that private person or entity’s affirmative, as opposed to default, permission.
54
See infra Section I.B.1.
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government speech doctrine. Finally, it ends by highlighting color
of speech doctrine and its importance to the Eastern District of
Virginia decision in Davison.
A. The First Amendment & Freedom of Speech
The constitutional right to freedom of speech55 originates in the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified as part of the
Bill of Rights on December 15, 1791,56 which states: “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”57 The First Amendment has since formed the basis for
a constitutional jurisprudence on citizens’ right to freedom of
speech, a federal right extended to the states through the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58
Not all speech is protected under the First Amendment. Speech
“of such slight social value as a step to truth”—because it actually
works against, rather than for, enhancing public discussion—that it
is “clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality”
is not protected.59 This is a byproduct of the notion that truth is a
product of those ideas that survive challenges faced in an open

55
What qualifies as “speech” for First Amendment protection goes well beyond verbal
communication, including art, pamphlets, newspapers, the act of spending, and other
forms of expression, so long as it communicates a message of the speaker. See generally
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (protecting
student newspapers as speech and recognizing government funding as speech); Se.
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (protecting a play’s content as speech).
56
See The Bill of Rights: A Transcription, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/
founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript#toc-the-preamble-to-the-bill-of-rights
[https://perma.cc/568D-GY3J ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).
57
U.S. CONST. amend. I. (emphasis added).
58
See id. amend. XIV, § 1. (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
59
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). See infra text in notes
61–65 for examples.
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marketplace of ideas.60 Speech categories that courts have found
harm, rather than enhance, discussions for the pursuit of truth (and
thus have no benefit to society) include: lewd speech;61 obscene
speech;62 profane speech;63 libelous speech;64 and insulting speech,
also referred to as “fighting” words65—and not to be confused with
political criticism, parody, or satire, which are protected categories
speech66—“[all of] which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”67 This Note refers
to such categories of speech as “unprotected” speech. In the
example of the President’s Twitter account, this might include
reply tweets that essentially amount to cursing out the President,
threatening him, or that spread unfounded lies about him—all
without some political context or message to give the speech social
value promoting the pursuit of truth.68
As discussed in Section I.B below, even the protection of
“protected” speech (i.e., speech with a value in the market for
discerning truth) varies depending upon the type of space in which
the speech takes place (i.e., the type of “forum”). The public forum
doctrine forms a gradient barrier for speech protection against
government intervention across various types of spaces, not by
whether they are physical or metaphysical, but rather dependent
60

See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.”); see also supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
61
See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding
lewd speech without political viewpoint unprotected by the First Amendment).
62
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008) (“We have long held
that obscene speech—sexually explicit material that violates fundamental notions of
decency—is not protected by the First Amendment.”).
63
See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256–57 (1952) (noting that the
prevention of “profane” speech was never thought to raise a constitutional problem).
64
See, e.g., id. at 266 (“Libelous utterances [are] not . . . within the area of
constitutionally protected speech.”).
65
See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–73 (1942) (holding socalled “fighting words,” speech likely to provoke violence, unworthy of
constitutional protection).
66
See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49–57 (1988) (holding First
Amendment protections apply to political parody, satire, and criticism, even under tort
damages claim).
67
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
68
See id.
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upon their public, or personal or private, character.69 This gradient
has continued to develop alongside technology.70 Even old dogs
such as traditional public fora are continuously being affected by
advancements in technology.71 As younger generations begin to
more frequently use social media to organize, meet, and plan for
protests and rallies in their local streets and parks as their
forefathers did before them, they now do so with their cell phones,
laptops, high-tech cameras, and GPS in tow, tracking their political
movements, and those of their participants, along the way.72 The
constitutional freedom of speech right has matured over the years,
growing within new pockets of speech law in areas of
technological advancement as courts continue to shape the
contours of new speech doctrine.73
B. Public Forum Doctrine: A Gradient of Speech Protection
Public forum doctrine governs First Amendment free speech
jurisprudence concerning the treatment of speech in both physical
and metaphysical public spaces.74 In 1939, the Supreme Court first
articulated the First Amendment’s protection of speech in public

69

See infra Section I.B (discussing how different levels of protection are afforded to
traditional, versus designated, versus limited, versus nonpublic fora).
70
See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 670–71, 676
(1998) (holding a live televised debate “was a nonpublic forum, from which [the
broadcaster] could exclude [a relatively unpopular candidate] in the reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral exercise of its journalistic discretion.”); see also Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010) (“Rapid changes in technology—and
the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel against
upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers.”).
71
See, e.g., The Role of Social Media in Accelerating a Revolution, supra note 50
(noting the various ways technology is used to enhance the visibility and organization of
protests); see also infra Section I.C.1 (explaining how traditional public forum doctrine
typically protects speech where protests are held).
72
See, e.g., The Role of Social Media in Accelerating a Revolution, supra note 50.
73
Compare Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n, 523 U.S. 666 (deciding on freedom of
speech issues relating to televised broadcasting of live debates as public fora), with
Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017)
(deciding on freedom of speech issues relating to politician’s social media website as a
public forum).
74
See supra note 53; see also infra Sections I.C.1–4 (discussing the different kinds of
spaces protected) and notes 169–70 and accompanying text (discussing newspapers and
license plates as metaphysical spaces).
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fora. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organizations,75
citizens belonging to the Committee for Industrial Organization
(“CIO”) sued the Mayor of Jersey City, New Jersey, among other
state officials,76 after officials forcibly removed their members
from public property for attempting to pass out written material in
the city and set up meetings to discuss the National Labor
Relations Act.77 Justice Robert Owens, speaking for the Supreme
Court, stated in dicta that “the use of the streets and public places”
had “from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens.”78 He found that citizens
communicating their political views and agendas in these spaces
could be regulated by the government, but only relative to the need
to preserve the rights of others, the general peace, and to prevent
chaos.79 Those regulations could not be a product of government
abuse against otherwise permissible protest.80 It has been argued
that Justice Owens’s opinion in Hague has since formed the basis
for the public forum doctrine,81 which recognizes a balance
between citizens’ traditional right to congregate in public spaces to
speak out on political matters, and the interest of the government in
managing its property.82
This balance was further articulated in Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights,83 where the Supreme Court pointed out that the
“nature of the forum” and other interests involved—such as the
government’s, and individuals’, interest in using their property84—
75

307 U.S. 496 (1939).
See id. at 500–03
77
See id.
78
Id. at 515–16.
79
See id.
80
See id.
81
See, e.g., Ross Rinehart, Note, “Friending” and “Following” the Government: How
the Public Forum and Government Speech Doctrines Discourage the Government’s
Social Media Presence, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 781, 791 n.54 (2013) (citing multiple
academics arguing for Hague’s place as the proper starting point for the public forum
doctrine, but noting at least one skeptic).
82
See id. at 792.
83
418 U.S. 298 (1974) (emphasis added).
84
See id. at 317 (noting that restrictions on speech must be “narrowly tailored to
protect the government’s substantial interest in preserving the viability and utility of the
forum itself.”); see also supra note 82 and accompanying text; infra notes 116–21 and
accompanying text.
76
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were integral to “the degree of protection afforded” to protected
speech.85 Since Hague, First Amendment jurisprudence has
recognized at least four kinds of fora, each with their own
respective characteristics and varying levels of protection for
speech: (1) the traditional public forum;86 (2) the designated public
forum;87 (3) the limited public forum;88 and (4) the
nonpublic forum.89
Examining the different types of fora available, both public and
nonpublic, is useful for understanding the distinctions between the
kinds of spaces that the First Amendment protects.90 However, it is
also important to stress that, for the purposes of viewpoint
discrimination analysis, the type of forum matters less, for
viewpoint discrimination against protectable speech91 is prohibited
in all public fora.92 Therefore, aside from the discussion in Section
I.B.1, which also introduces the concepts of content discrimination,
viewpoint discrimination, reasonable time, place, or manner
restrictions, and strict scrutiny review, the various types of fora are
only briefly addressed for their characteristics and the level of
protection they afford. Again, this is so that readers have a better
sense of what constitutes a protectable space for speech versus a
purely private space, and all the gradient spaces in between.93
85

See id. at 302–03 (emphasis added).
See infra Section I.B.1.
87
See infra Section I.B.2.
88
See infra Section I.B.3.
89
See infra Section I.B.4.
90
By examining the different characteristics of the varying types of fora, it is easier to
describe the President’s Twitter account in terms of First Amendment free
speech jurisprudence.
91
See supra Section I.A (discussing unprotectable types of speech).
92
Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d 1062,
1067 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The ‘viewpoint discrimination’ prohibited in all fora is ‘an
egregious form of content discrimination’ in which the government ‘targets not subject
matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject.’” (citing Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995))).
93
For examples of private spaces that do not protect against viewpoint discrimination,
think of circumstances where the government or a public entity or utility is uninvolved in
hosting guest speech—such as private homes and stores. See, e.g., People v. Bush, 349
N.E.2d 832, 839 (N.Y. 1976) (“One aspect of the balance sought to be attained concerns
the circumstances under which private property may be utilized for picketing activity, for
‘[i]t is, of course, a commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a
guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal[,] or state.’” (quoting Hudgens
86
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1. An Introduction to Speech in Spaces: Traditional Public
Fora, Content & Viewpoint Discrimination, Reasonable
Time, Place, or Manner Restrictions, & Strict
Scrutiny Review
Traditional public fora afford the highest level of protection for
freedom of speech. They are categorized as those spaces with a
long American tradition of commitment to public assembly and
debate, where “State” (i.e., government)94 authority to restrict
speech is viewed most skeptically.95 This forum essentially
consists of “streets and parks,” which, since before the American
Revolution,96 were used for political assembly, debate, and
discourse.97 Thus, traditional public fora are the poster-child for
spaces that have been devoted to public speech, debate, and protest
throughout our history. For this reason, it makes sense to begin the
discussion of the other doctrines relating to public fora here, where
public forum protection is strongest, and where the doctrine began.
This Note then addresses the other individual types of public fora,
as well as the varying constrictions and protections of public
speech in other spaces (i.e., fora).
As Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
famously put it, “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”98 This is a
remarkably American way of describing freedom of speech in
terms of our capitalistic society: Truth is a product of those ideas
that can withstand competing arguments and viewpoints; ideas
v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976))); Aluli v. Trusdell, 508 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Haw.
1973) (holding, in the case of landlord premises, “no state action is involved, which
denies or infringes the tenant’s right to exercise his First Amendment
Constitutional rights”).
94
Note, the capitalized word “State” is generally synonymous with “government” in
cases where the Supreme Court refers to “State,” as the same First Amendment standard
is applied to both the federal and the state government through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process clause. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
95
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
96
See Parliamentary Taxation of Colonies, International Trade, and the American
Revolution, 1763–1775, Part of Milestones: 1750–1775, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1750-1775/parliamentary-taxation
[https://perma.cc/5SRE-EQ52] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
97
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
98
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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with the best logic and evidence behind them—a distillation of
truth from survival of the fittest speech.99 In other words, the
pursuit of truth, political or otherwise, depends upon an open
discourse between groups with differing viewpoints, opinions, and
ideologies.100 The inverse also holds true: To avoid being captured
by political speech divorced from logic and evidence, and thus
truth (i.e., propaganda), individuals need to challenge their inner
logic and philosophies in the “competition of the market” so they
can identify flaws in each other’s reasoning and supplement their
education with opposing viewpoints.101
In true American form, the Founders of the Constitution
honored dissention, so that the First Amendment prevents the
government from banning speech merely because of the
government’s “disapproval of the ideas expressed.”102 The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that government restrictions that
ban speech because of its content are presumptively invalid.103
Thus, without meeting a high bar of judicial review, called “strict
scrutiny” review,104 a government—state or federal—cannot
selectively censor speech it agrees or disagrees with on the basis of
that speech’s content.105 This concept decries governmentsponsored content discrimination (i.e., propaganda), while still
allowing speech restrictions in cases where the restriction is
content-neutral, and thus does not discriminate on the basis
of content.106
99

See id.
See id.
101
See id.
102
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
103
See id.
104
See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (“Statutes affecting constitutional
rights must be drawn with ‘precision,’ and must be ‘tailored’ to serve their legitimate
objectives. And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser
burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater
interference. If it acts at all, it must choose ‘less drastic means.’” (citations omitted) (first
quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); then quoting United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967); then quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631
(1969); and then quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
105
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382.
106
Id. An example of content discrimination might be a case where a local government
bans all newspapers discussing foreign forms of government or bans television shows
depicting women in the workplace. An example of content-neutral restrictions might
100
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A cousin of the prohibition on content discrimination is
viewpoint discrimination.107 Viewpoint discrimination is similar to
content discrimination, except that it prohibits the government
from censoring a speaker’s speech on the basis of viewpoint, rather
than on the basis of content.108 To allow the government to censor
on the basis of viewpoint directly conflicts with the proper
functioning of the “competition of the market” idea expressed by
Justice Holmes for distilling truth from speech.109 For example, in
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,110
student participants of a university magazine that promoted
Christianity brought suit against their school for refusing to pay for
their printing costs, while paying for other magazines’ printing
costs.111 The basis for the university’s decision was grounded on
its guidelines, which denied printing funds to magazines based on,
inter alia, having a religious or political agenda, or a viewpoint that
would otherwise interfere with the university’s ability to file for
tax-exempt status.112 The Supreme Court held that because the
university was a public institution (i.e., a creature of the state), and
its school newspapers were public spaces (albeit, metaphysical),
the university’s rule requiring public officials to sift through and
ban certain content because of the viewpoints expressed in them
violated students’ freedom of speech.113
As explained in Rosenberger, the Supreme Court takes a strict
stance against viewpoint discrimination in public spaces—even
metaphysical spaces such as newspapers.114 This was so even
though the university newspaper at issue in Rosenberger was not a
include a case where the same government bans newspapers issued without a vendor
license or bans all television shows after 5:00 PM. The former bans speech based on the
content of the newspaper or show, whereas the latter bans speech based on some
other criteria.
107
See infra notes 108–13 and accompanying text.
108
See, e.g., Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470
F.3d 1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen the government opens its property to private
speech, it may not discriminate based upon the viewpoint of the speaker.”).
109
See supra text accompanying notes 98–101.
110
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
111
See id. at 826–27.
112
Id. at 825.
113
Id. at 845.
114
Id. at 828.
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traditional public forum.115 Nonetheless, the government may
restrict speech in even traditional public fora by imposing
reasonable time, place, or manner limitations, so long as they are
content-neutral and survive strict scrutiny.116 The reasonable time,
place, or manner doctrine allows the government to impose
restrictions on speech where that speech is inappropriate or
otherwise infringes on the protected rights of others.117 The
Supreme Court explained that such restrictions are necessary
because certain speech—depending on its time, place, or manner—
can “frustrate legitimate governmental goals.”118 Consider the
following apt metaphor from the Supreme Court: “No matter what
its [political] message, a roving sound truck that blares at [two in
the morning] disturbs neighborhood tranquility.”119 Why would a
truck driver have to blare its horn in a town full of sleeping citizens
at that particular time to get its political message across? What
would that message even be? This logic conforms with the
reasoning behind why citizens, despite a constitutional freedom of
speech, and regardless of the political message, cannot shout
“bomb” on an airplane. Such speech could incite panic and,
foreseeably, cause serious injury.120
Reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions are thus one
type of limitation on freedom of speech in public fora. Thus, even
if in protest, say, to something the President says on Twitter, a
truck driver’s loud and persistent honking on a neighborhood street
(a traditional public forum) in the wee hours of the night may not
be protected.121 In such a scenario, where there are alternative
channels for a truck driver to protest, and the goal is not to
suppress the truck driver’s viewpoint, but rather to enforce the
content-neutral aim of allowing citizens to sleep in their homes at
115
Compare id. (discussing a university newspaper), with supra notes 94–97 and
accompanying text (discussing traditional public fora typically consisting of public streets
and parks).
116
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
See generally infra notes 122–26 (discussing strict scrutiny review).
117
See Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980).
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
See id.
121
See infra notes 116–19 and accompanying text.
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night, courts are less likely to find impermissible censorship of
political speech if the government restricts the honking.
If the government imposes such restrictions on the freedom of
speech, the restriction is subject to a “strict scrutiny” test—a
court’s tool for discerning whether a Constitutional violation has
occurred because of government regulation.122 The strict scrutiny
test is the highest bar to pass for any government restriction on
speech, requiring the government to show why the restriction is
both necessary and cannot be accomplished in a less restrictive
way.123 The test is broken into two parts, determining both: (1)
whether the government has a compelling interest for the
restrictive law; and (2) whether that law was narrowly tailored to
the interest at hand.124 “Narrowly tailored” means: (1) that the law
is neither over-inclusive (i.e., is only as restrictive as necessary to
achieve the government’s compelling interest) nor under-inclusive
(i.e., actually achieves the compelling interest);125 and (2)
sufficiently permits the speech to be heard through alternate
means.126 Note, while this may lead to a scenario where a
reasonable restriction on content may be imposed, based on a
compelling government interest (e.g., trucks honking on a public
street at two in the morning, or shouting “bomb” on an airplane),
122

Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1273
(2007) (“In modern constitutional law, the term ‘strict scrutiny’ refers to a test under
which statutes will be pronounced unconstitutional unless they are ‘necessary’ or
‘narrowly tailored’ to serve a ‘compelling governmental interest.’” (citing Johnson v.
California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995))).
123
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983);
Fallon, Jr., supra note 122, at 1332–33 (“The Supreme Court . . . frequently presents the
strict scrutiny inquiry as if it possessed two discrete parts. First, has the government
defended a challenged regulation by referring to the need to protect a genuinely
compelling interest? Second, if so, is the challenged regulation narrowly tailored to that
interest in the sense of being neither under- nor overinclusive?”); see also Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
124
See Fallon, Jr., supra note 122, at 1332–33.
125
See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The
Government may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means [i.e., is not overinclusive] to further the articulated interest [i.e., is not under-inclusive].”).
126
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(“[R]estrictions of this kind are valid provided that they . . . leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.”).
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discrimination based on viewpoint is not a compelling government
interest for courts.127
2. Designated Public Fora
Designated public fora are spaces that could initially be
described as private property, but which are then, by virtue of the
government, opened up to the public to allow public speech and
expression.128 Examples include places such as university
facilities,129 school board meetings,130 and town theaters.131 Thus,
unlike the traditional public forum, the designated public forum
consists of property not open to the public by default, but by virtue
of their having been designated a public space by
the government.132
Designated public fora offer less protection than traditional
public fora—public parks and streets—in the sense that the
government can revert the space back to serving a private purpose
when it desires.133 This is because the space initially belonged to
the government, rather than the people.134 However, so long as the
government offers the designated forum to the general public for
speech and expression, the space is entitled to the same protections
as a traditional public forum.135 Thus, strict scrutiny should still
apply to designated public fora, so long as they are designated as

127

See infra notes 142–44 and accompanying text, and example offered for explanation
in paragraph text accompanying note 144.
128
See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
129
See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (holding that a university
that banned students belonging to a religious group from using its buildings for worship
and meetings violated free speech rights).
130
See, e.g., City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisc. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429
U.S. 167, 175–76 (1976) (holding it improper to require a board of education to
discriminate against teachers by prohibiting them from attending a public meeting while
allowing union representatives to do the same).
131
See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561–62 (1975) (holding a
municipal board’s denial of a theatrical production company’s application to use a cityleased theater for their play on account of the play’s content improper).
132
See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
133
See id. (insinuating government restrictions on speech in designated fora need not be
subject to strict scrutiny review so long as they are not designated as public).
134
Cf. id. at 46.
135
See id.
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open to the public.136 Additionally, even when the designated
forum is public, reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions—
just as with traditional public fora—are fair game, with the caveat
that any content-based restrictions still have to pass strict scrutiny
review.137 This means that, in the case of the President’s Twitter
account, if that account is designated by the government as public,
and then later closed for a private purpose, there is no recourse for
viewpoint discrimination that occurs while the account is kept
private to the individual. Viewpoint discrimination is not
prohibited in an individual’s private forum, or social media
account, so long as that individual is not acting in the role of
the government.138
3. Limited Public Fora
A limited public forum is characterized as a space where “the
limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created” may
justify restrictions on speech—even content restrictions—so long
as they do not discriminate on a basis of viewpoint.139 Thus, this
type of space may confine speech to specific people and specific
topics, so long as that was the purpose for which the space was
created, and that purpose was legitimate.140 In these fora then, the
government is “like the private owner of property” that opens up
their property for a specific purpose.141 Once the limited public
forum is opened, the government must respect its restrictions and
not discriminate against speech that satisfies the conditions it set
for participation in the forum.142 This leads to the unique situation
136

See id.
Id.
138
See supra note 93; see also infra Section I.C.2 (discussing when an individual
elected to public office is deemed to have acted as the government, rather than
his or herself).
139
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
140
See id. Examples might include a government seminar with attendance open to the
public, but limited by content to discussions on pharmaceuticals, and limited by speaker
to experts in the industry; or a government chat room dedicated to a public Q&A, with
discussions limited to, cybersecurity.
141
See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
390 (1993).
142
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804–06 (1985)).
137
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where content can be discriminated against, while viewpoint
discrimination is still prohibited. This is because, regardless of the
limited topic of discussion (i.e., content restrictions involved) or
limited set of speakers, the viewpoints of those limited speakers,
on that limited topic of discussion, are within the lawful bounds the
government has set, and cannot thus be discriminated against.143
Take the example of the President’s Twitter account. Let us say
the President officially opened his Twitter account to the public
with two limitations in mind that he regularly enforces: (1) the
topic of discussion is immigration reform; and (2) only users who
are respected scholars in the field are permitted to discuss the
issue. Content-based restrictions in that forum on topics dealing
with issues beyond immigration reform would be permissible
under the First Amendment.144 Thus, Twitter users posting
criticism, or anything for that matter, unrelated to immigration
reform may be blocked from the forum because it was opened for a
limited purpose—the discussion of immigration reform.
Additionally, even Twitter users posting comments on his account
related to immigration reform may be blocked from the account if
they are not respected scholars in the field. However, any respected
scholar in the field criticizing the President on his views relating to
immigration reform, or posting content about immigration reform
that the President disagrees with, would be protected from having
their viewpoint on the topic censored (assuming, that is, that the
President really did intend the forum to be open, just limited to a
particular discussion).
Note how, as described above, regardless of the purpose or
type of forum—whether traditional, designated, or limited—
viewpoint discrimination in a public forum is always prohibited.
4. Nonpublic Fora
Nonpublic fora are characterized as “public property which
[are] not by tradition or designation a forum for public
143

See id.
See id. at 829–30 (“[W]e have observed a distinction between, on the one hand,
content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that
limited forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed
impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”).
144
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communication.”145 One example of such a forum is a courthouse
lobby,146 which is probably used for facilitating court proceedings
as opposed to public discussion. Protestors may be able to voice
their concerns on the courthouse steps or the street beside it, but
the lobby within may justifiably prohibit protest within. These fora
are thus afforded different gradients of protection from restrictions
on speech,147 are subject to time, place, or manner regulations,148
and the government can restrict speech within the forum so long as
the restriction is reasonable and not a cloaked attempt to silence
particular viewpoints.149 In other words, the nonpublic forum,
while by its very nature not intended for public discussion,
nonetheless presents the possibility that speakers with access to it
for its intended purposes can bring successful viewpoint
discrimination claims.150
While a nonpublic forum may sound similar to a limited public
forum, the difference lies in that a limited public forum is opened
by the government to the public for a specific communicative
purpose, whereas the nonpublic forum can conceivably be opened
to a private audience for noncommunicative purposes, while still
remaining subject to viewpoint discrimination.151 While the ability
of the government to enforce time, place, or manner restrictions is
expanded,152 viewpoint discrimination retains its presumptive
invalidity under the First Amendment.153 Using the President’s
Twitter account again as an example, if the account was passwordprotected so that only White House employees could access it for
work-related purposes, there may be a host of reasonable time,
place, or manner restrictions. Such restrictions might limit speech
or expression to work-related activity, certain time periods of the
145

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
See Gay Guardian Newspaper v. Ohoopee Reg’l Library Sys., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1362,
1367 (S.D. Ga. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Gay Guardian Newspaper v. Ohoopee Reg’l, 90 F.
App’x 386 (11th Cir. 2003).
147
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46.
148
See infra notes 116–20 and accompanying text.
149
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46.
150
See id.
151
See id.
152
Namely, because the forum is capable of being private and unconcerned with
communicative value.
153
See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46.
146
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day when the account could be accessed (such as working hours),
and the language and decorum of speech on the account could be
restricted to professional standards. Regardless, any employees
working within these constraints who are censored because of their
take on a work-related issue may have a viewpoint
discrimination claim.154
C. Government as Speaker
Speech protections vary considerably when the government
itself acts as speaker. The first part of this Section discusses when
the government “speaks” through selective financial assistance to
entities promoting its goals and through its discretionary rules in
government license plate programs. The second part of this Section
discusses when government speech transforms the private spaces
of its employees into public fora.
1. Government Speech Doctrine
Viewpoint discrimination of protectable speech155 retains its
presumption of invalidity regardless of the type of forum it may
take place in.156 Nonetheless, the government speech doctrine
provides an arguable exception to the protection against
viewpoint discrimination.157
Government speech doctrine is the concept that when the
government, as opposed to a citizen, makes protectable (and legal)
speech, it has the right to protect its own message.158 For speech to
qualify as government speech, the government must decide the
overall message of that speech and approve what is used to convey
it.159 In these situations, the government can protect its speech
154

See id.
Remember, the analysis into different gradients of speech protection in Section I.B
necessarily assumes first that the speech is the kind protected under the First Amendment.
See infra Section I.A.
156
See supra Sections I.B.1–4.
157
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (“To hold that the Government
unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a
program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because the program in
advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals, would render numerous
Government programs constitutionally suspect.”).
158
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
159
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
155
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from being “garbled,” or distorted, by those sponsored by its
speech, or otherwise appropriating the speech with the
government’s blessing.160
Government “speech,” according to the Supreme Court,
includes, inter alia, when the government funds private entities
with public monies to disseminate its message.161 This is the mirror
image of organizations influencing the government through
lobbying efforts, or of activists pressuring the government through
social awareness programs; by expending private funds on the
messages they want to convey to the government, private entities
get the government to listen, and perhaps, obey.162 Government
speech is the reverse scenario, where the government influences
private entities by expending public funds, which may involve a
government choice concerning which viewpoint it takes on a
particular topic—abortion, health care, smoking, guns, etc. (i.e.,
what this Author, although not this Note, argues is akin to
viewpoint discrimination).163
If the government chooses to disburse funds to health care
providers that abstain from abortion procedures, and this is a
legitimate, albeit, legal cause, it may do so.164 The inverse is also
true: If the government chooses not to support abortions as a policy
matter, then the government does not have to continue providing
funds to organizations that promote opposite messages.165 After all,
the government is providing its sponsorship when it funds private
organizations, and if those funded organizations are doing exactly
what the government is fighting against, they distort the

160

See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
Id.
162
See Resources for Foundations Funding and Supporting Advocacy, BOLDER
ADVOCACY, https://bolderadvocacy.org/focus-on-foundations/resources-for-foundationsfunding-and-supporting-advocacy
[https://perma.cc/R3VM-4RQ7]
(last
visited
Feb. 1, 2018).
163
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
164
See id.
165
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (“When Congress established a National
Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles,
it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of
political philosophy such as communism and fascism.” (citations omitted)).
161
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government’s mission to the perception of those that recognize the
government’s partnership with that organization.166
One of a seminal set of decisions surrounding the government
speech doctrine, collectively referred to as the Specialty License
Plate cases, was Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc.167 This case marked a new distinction in public fora
jurisprudence, where the Supreme Court held that specially printed
license plates, although created at the request of individuals,
constituted government speech and were neither limited nor
designated public fora.168 Thus, unlike the student newspaper at
issue in Rosenberger, which the Supreme Court found to be a
public forum despite its metaphysical, rather than physical, spatial
qualities,169 the Supreme Court here held that license plates were a
metaphysical space where speech is reserved to the government.170
It found so “based on the historical context, observers’ reasonable
interpretation of the messages conveyed by Texas specialty plates,
and the effective control that the State exerts over the design
selection process.”171 The participation of citizens in designing and
propagating the specialty license plates could not overcome the
government character reflected by, nor the control exerted over,
the specialty license plates.172 In so holding, the Supreme Court
upheld the State of Texas’s right to refuse to print specialty license
plates depicting Confederate battle flags, namely because of the
state’s interest in protecting its own expressive content.173 What
makes this decision so significant, is that the Supreme Court
allowed Texas to discriminate against Confederate battle flag
designs (a form of speech) in favor of other designs in its selection
process.174 Thus, while not directly censoring speech on the basis
of viewpoint, the government may still favor the speech of one
166

See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
135 S. Ct. 2239, 2243–44 (2015) (dealing with specialty license plate design prints
requested by Texan citizens and the state government’s role in approving or denying
certain designs).
168
See id. at 2250–51.
169
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
170
See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2251.
171
Id.
172
See id.
173
See id. at 2253–54.
174
See id. at 2251, 2253–54.
167
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speaker over another so long as that speaker’s goals conform with
its own, even at the detriment to the cause of another
speaker’s viewpoint.175
2. Section 1983 and the Color of Law Doctrines176
The “color of law” doctrine allows plaintiffs in civil rights
actions to bring claims against government actors that were
conducting themselves in their public (i.e., professional), as
opposed to nonpublic (i.e., private), capacities.177 The color of state
law doctrine deals with claims against state-based officials, and
originates from title 42 of the U.S. Code, section 1983,178 which
provides for a civil action against the government for a deprivation
of rights under the Constitution and U.S. law.179 To state a claim,
“[o]ne must trace the challenged conduct to the government.”180
Courts look to the totality of circumstances to determine whether a
public official, when infringing on the fundamental rights of
others, was acting in his or her official (i.e., governmental)
capacity, or as a private citizen.181
In Davison, the Eastern District of Virginia assessed whether
Randall, the Chair of the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors,
was acting in her official capacity as a representative of the
government, or a private citizen, when she blocked the plaintiff
constituent from her Facebook account.182 In weighing the totality

175

See supra notes 161–66, 173–74.
Throughout this Note, the Author refers to the color of state law doctrine and the
color of federal law doctrine collectively and individually. Both of these concepts are
defined in the Section below. For purposes of clarity, when referring to the “color of law”
or the “color of law doctrine,” the Author is referring to both collectively. When the
Author refers to “color of state law” or “color of federal law” doctrine, they are being
treated separately from their sister doctrine.
177
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F.
Supp. 3d 702, 712–14 (E.D. Va. 2017).
178
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
179
See id.
180
Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d 712.
181
See id. at 712–14 (quoting Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 527 n.1 (4th Cir.
2003)). Examples of factors that might appear in a color of state law totality analysis
necessarily differ depending upon the facts of each case, but for examples in the social
media context, see infra note 183 and accompanying text.
182
See id. at 711–14.
176
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of the circumstances under the color of state law analysis, the court
pointed to the following factors:
Among other things, (1) the title of the page
includes Defendant’s title; (2) the page is
categorized as that of a government official; (3) the
page lists as contact information Defendant’s
official County email address and the telephone
number of Defendant’s County office; (4) the page
includes the web address of Defendant’s official
County website; (5) many—perhaps most—of the
posts are expressly addressed to “Loudoun,”
Defendant’s constituents; (6) Defendant has
submitted posts on behalf of the Loudoun County
Board of Supervisors as a whole; (7) Defendant has
asked her constituents to use the page as a channel
for “back and forth constituent conversations”; and
(8) the content posted has a strong tendency toward
matters related to Defendant’s office.183
Based on these characteristics of her “personal” social media
account, the court concluded that Randall’s Facebook account
activity was primarily a function of her professional (i.e.,
governmental) persona rather than her personal or private persona,
and held that she acted under color of state law in maintaining her
Facebook page.184
The color of state law analysis the Eastern District of Virginia
employed is applicable to the question of whether the President
acts in his official governmental or personal capacity when
maintaining his Twitter account and blocking constituents.
Notably, the Twitter account at issue in the Trump case is the
President’s personal @realDonaldTrump account, rather than the
official President of the United States @POTUS account.185 If the
viewpoint discrimination at issue in Trump took place on the
@POTUS account, the analysis of this Note would take a different
turn. There would be no need to analyze whether there is a
183

See id. at 714.
See id.
185
See President Trump (@POTUS), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/potus?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/6RSW-ULWU ] (last visited Mar. 30, 2018).
184
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sufficient connection between the private individual account of
Donald J. Trump, the man, and his position/actions as the
President, to render the account an “official” public account. The
only analysis that would take place with respect to the @POTUS
account is whether social media generally, and Twitter pages in
particular, are public fora. As addressed in the Introduction, and as
argued more fully in Section II.A, social media platforms,
including Twitter pages, are the new public fora.
In Davison, a public official’s personal Facebook account was
rendered a public forum. For the most part, the same factors in
Davison can be checked against the President’s personal Twitter
page. However, when looking at the actions of a federal official,
we would presumably look to the color of federal law doctrine
instead of the color of state law doctrine.186
Federal officials cannot be liable under the color of state law
doctrine.187 The color of federal law doctrine is the product of a
court-created work-around to the prohibition of using the color of
state law doctrine in civil claims against federal officials for
damages.188 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,189 the Supreme Court held for the first time
that individuals held a private right of action against federal
officials, acting under color of federal law, for “damages [that]
may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of the
Fourth Amendment” (a “Bivens claim”).190 Thus, to qualify for a
color of federal law claim, a plaintiff must declare both a Fourth
Amendment violation191 and seek damages.192 Thus, a color of

186

See, e.g., Bender v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 539 F. Supp. 2d 702, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 (1963) (“[42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985]
of the Civil Rights Act are clearly inapplicable to this kind of case.”); Duncan v. Goedeke
& Cleasey, 837 F. Supp. 846, 849 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (“Section 1983 protects persons who
were deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities under color of state or local law, not
federal law. Therefore, federal officers acting under color of federal law . . . are not
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
188
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 427–28 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
189
See id. at 395–97 (majority opinion).
190
See id. at 395.
191
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unlawful searches and seizures by
the government without a warrant:
187
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federal law claim is brought under a Fourth, rather than First,
Amendment claim.193
Despite this, the Southern District of New York has stated, in a
Bivens claim for monetary damages against a federal official or
agent, “[t]o determine whether a defendant has acted under color
of federal law for purposes of a Bivens action, courts look to the
more established body of law that defines the analogous term—
under color of state law—with regard to actions under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.”194 Not only is this statement important because it comes
from the Southern District of New York, where the Knight
Institute brought suit against the President, but it specifically
directs the court’s analysis to “the more established body of law”
under color of state law analysis.195 The Second Circuit, too, has
recognized that “Courts of Appeals have held that section 1983
concepts of state action apply in determining whether action was
taken ‘under color of federal law’ for Bivens purposes.”196
But does color of federal law apply outside of Bivens cases? If
so, what role do the concepts of viewpoint discrimination and
government speech have to play in the analysis? How does a color
of federal law claim stand up to the President of the United States?
Before addressing these questions, this Note must first
determine whether, in fact, the President’s Twitter account even
serves as a public forum. Namely, does a viewpoint discrimination
claim have a platform, so to speak, to stand on when talking about
the President’s Twitter account? As discussed above, when
venturing into new areas of communicative innovation, it is
important to keep an open mind as speech doctrine necessarily

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
192
See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395.
193
See id.
194
Id.
195
See id.
196
Chin v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
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II. VIEWPOINT ON THE PRESIDENT’S CONDUCT ON HIS PERSONAL
TWITTER ACCOUNT
The first Section of this Part opens with the initial inquiry into
whether social media generally function as public fora, rather than
private fora, because a viewpoint discrimination claim will not
succeed in the latter.197 In the second Section, the analysis then
turns to whether the President’s personal Twitter account serves as
a public forum. Finally, in the third Section, this Part examines
(assuming the President’s Twitter account serves as a public
forum) whether the President violates the First Amendment for
viewpoint discrimination when he bans constituents from his
personal social media account because they posted messages that
were critical of him.
A. Social Media (Generally) Functions as a Public Forum
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,
the Supreme Court made clear that public fora protection extends
beyond traditional physical spaces into metaphysical spaces.198
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that a student-run religious
newspaper was “a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial
or geographic sense, but the same principles [we]re applicable.”199
Thus, although the student newspaper at issue in that case was in
no sense a traditional public forum—i.e., spaces comparable to
public streets and sidewalks—the Supreme Court made clear that
the same principles applied.200

197

See Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee
of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or state.
Thus, while statutory or common law may in some situations extend protection or
provide redress against a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the free
expression of others, no such protection or redress is provided by the Constitution
itself.”); supra note 93 and accompanying text.
198
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
199
Id.
200
See id.
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The Rosenberger Court did little to explain how it came to this
conclusion.201 What it did do was point to its decision in Lamb’s
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District202 for
guidance because it was the most recent and relevant case on
point.203 Lamb’s Chapel concerned a church that wanted to use a
school’s facilities, pursuant to the school district’s regulations, to
publicly exhibit movies for religious purposes.204 The content of
those movies related to education about modern family and child
rearing issues, and the ways in which traditional Christian values
remedied these issues.205 Despite the school regulation that school
property could be used for social, civic, and recreational purposes,
the local school district denied the church’s request because of the
movies’ religious agenda.206 The church brought charges alleging,
inter alia, that the school district had violated its freedom of speech
while acting under color of state law.207
The Rosenberger Court explained how, in Lamb’s Chapel, it
had unanimously decided that it was viewpoint discrimination to
allow all views on family issues to the exception of religious
views.208 The aspects of Lamb’s Chapel that made it most related
to Rosenberger were most likely the factual circumstances of a
school restricting access to school resources on the basis of
religious viewpoint.209 However, in Lamb’s Chapel, as opposed to
Rosenberger, at issue was the use of a physical, rather than
metaphysical, space.210
The common link between the two cases, aside from the
inherent tensions between a school and its religious community,
rests on the restriction to use publicly available resources and
201

See id. at 830–31.
508 U.S. 384 (1993).
203
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
204
See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387–89.
205
See id. at 388.
206
Id. at 388–89, 391.
207
Id. at 389.
208
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (alteration in original) (quoting Lamb’s Chapel,
508 U.S. at 393).
209
See id. at 830; Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393.
210
Compare Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (regarding use of space within a twodimensional newspaper), with Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386–87 (regarding use of
space within a three-dimensional school building).
202
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property.211 One might argue that a metaphysical element in
Lamb’s Chapel was the restriction on films, and this was what
rendered the case most related to Rosenberger, but it makes more
sense to view the property where the public would gather to view
those films as the real property at issue. In fact, one falters to find
any case relating to public fora that does not involve a restriction
on the use of publicly accessible property or resources; despite the
fact that the focus of the protection is on speech.212 The Internet—
and by extension social media websites—fits into this scheme, as
social media is undoubtedly both a publicly accessible property
and a resource.213
Regardless of whatever the real rationale behind the
Rosenberger decision was, metaphysical spaces can be, and are,
treated as public fora when they fit the characteristics of one.214
Thus, social media websites, which are themselves a metaphysical
space,215 cannot be excluded as public fora on mere account of
their not being actual, physical spaces.216
If newspapers are protected as public fora, why not social
media? Newspapers and social media have more in common every
day. Like newspapers, social media websites do not consist of a
physical space in the real property sense, but rather in the
metaphysical sense, because human beings cannot physically step
into either a newspaper or website. Additionally, social media have
211

Compare Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (restricting school funds, both as property
and a resource, to print student run newspaper, also as a resource and property), with
Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393 (restricting access to school facilities, both as property
and a resource, to play films, both as property and a resource).
212
See supra Part I.
213
Whether intellectual property or otherwise, social media websites are “owned” by an
entity and are used by billions of people. See, e.g., Kurt Wagner, Who Owns Twitter? A
Look at the Players Who Could Make or Break a Deal., RECODE (Aug. 11, 2016),
https://www.recode.net/2016/8/11/12417064/twitter-stock-ownership-takeoveracquisition-challenges [https://perma.cc/EA4A-RNTM]; see also Packingham v. North
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (noting that, according to sources cited to the
Supreme Court, Facebook has 1.79 billion active users, which is “about three times the
population of North America”).
214
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
215
The Author uses the term “metaphysical” in the same sense the Rosenberger Court
did, namely, spaces that are not traditional “spatial or geographic” properties. See id.
216
See id.
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increasingly taken on the same functions as newspapers.217 In fact,
a majority of Americans report using social media for their
news.218 Twitter is no exception.219
According to the Pew Research Center, “[s]ince 2013, at least
half of Twitter users have reported getting news on the site, but in
2017, with a [P]resident who frequently makes announcements on
the platform, that share has increased to about three-quarters
([seventy-four percent]), up [fifteen] percentage points from last
year.”220 Thus, not only do Americans increasingly use social
media—and Twitter more specifically—as a news source, but the
increasing use of Twitter for news actually correlates with the
President’s frequent use of Twitter since he took office in 2017.221
It thus stands to reason that the President’s Twitter account, if not a
growing news source itself, may actually be responsible for
Twitter’s increased audience for news.222
The Fourth Circuit has directly analogized social media to
newspapers. In Liverman v. City of Petersburg, the court
recognized that social media sites like Facebook are at least like
newspapers in two respects: (1) they are spaces where news stories
or opinions are shared with members of the community; and (2)
individuals may submit (i.e., participate) in the content appearing
on those spaces.223 Further, what more pertinent point of view is
there to communicate and share than the President’s when it comes
217

See Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, News Use Across Social Media Platforms
2017, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/newsuse-across-social-media-platforms-2017/ [https://perma.cc/44GN-P8F4].
218
According to a new Pew Research Center study, “[a]s of August 2017, two-thirds
([sixty-seven percent]) of Americans report that they get at least some of their news on
social media—with two-in-ten doing so often.” See id.
219
See id. (describing the swell in numbers of social media users that have come to rely
on Twitter as a source of news).
220
See id. (emphasis added).
221
See id.
222
See id. Note that, while it is tempting to assume the President’s Twitter account was
directly responsible for Twitter’s increase as a news source, the data from the Pew
Research Center merely supports, at most, a correlation between the two. See id.
223
See Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 410 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Facebook is
a dynamic medium through which users can interact and share news stories or opinions
with members of their community. Similar to writing a letter to a local newspaper,
publicly posting on social media suggests an intent to “communicate to the public or to
advance a political or social point of view beyond the employment context.”).
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to politics?224 While reporters of every major newspaper in the
United States scramble to attend White House press conferences in
the hopes of asking a question or getting a word in with the
President, it is the President that scrambles to Twitter.225 Twitter
probably has more exposure to the President than the various
traditional news outlets we would normally rely on for news about
the President and the ways in which our federal government
is being led.226
That is not to say that social media are only public fora in so
much as they are growing to resemble the same function as
newspapers. The most authoritative source for finding that social
media act as public fora is the Supreme Court itself. Just this year
in Packingham v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court majority
found that the “democratic forums of the Internet,” and social
media in particular, constituted the most important fora for the
exchange of views in our modern society.227 At issue in that case
was a North Carolina law that made it a crime for registered sex
offenders to join commercial social media where the offender has
knowledge that minor children can become members or create
account pages.228 In striking down the law as an unconstitutionally
broad abrogation of free speech, the majority stressed that the law
was a “bar to the exercise of First Amendment rights on websites
integral to the fabric of our modern society and culture.”229 Thus,
224

See Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 263, 264 (2006) (“[P]residents are held politically accountable for how
the federal government as a whole functions, and in particular for how administrative
agencies exercise their vast delegated powers.”).
225
See Trump, supra note 5 (showing 1,376 tweets (or, Twitter posts) from the
President this year alone since joining Twitter in January 2017).
226
See infra note 238 and accompanying text (describing how the President posts
tweets on Twitter on a near-daily, and sometimes near-hourly, basis); see also Stack,
supra note 224 (noting how the President is considered accountable for the federal
government as a whole).
227
137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (“While in the past there may have been difficulty in
identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today
the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’ in
general, and social media in particular.” (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added)
(quoting Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997))).
228
See id. at 1733 (emphasis added) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-202.5(a), (e)
(West 2015)).
229
See id. at 1738.
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there exists near-explicit authority from the highest court in the
United States that the Internet generally, and social media in
particular, not only qualify as public fora,230 but have become
necessary to “the exchange of views” in our culture and society.231
Importantly, the state law at issue in Packingham prohibited
access to commercial (i.e., for-profit) social media websites, such
as Facebook and Twitter, and the Supreme Court still struck the
law down as a First Amendment violation.232 Thus, even
government restrictions to commercial website access—those
owned by private, rather than government, entities—can rise to the
level of a First Amendment violation.233 Viewpoint discrimination
analysis, which concerns itself with restrictions on speech in places
open to the public for the exchange of ideas, is readily applicable
to commercial social media.234
In sum it would be paradoxical to afford public forum
protection to newspapers and not to social media.235 This is
especially true given that public forum issues must involve a
restriction to some kind of publicly accessible property or
resource—of which social media is no exception.236 Further, the
majority in the Packingham Supreme Court decision made it
abundantly clear that they believe the Internet, and social media in
particular, are “the most important places . . . for the exchange of
views”—or the most important species of public fora—in modern
society.237 Supporting this conclusion is the fact that the
President’s Twitter posts have generated a greater reliance on
social media as a news source this year alone, and that his heavily
sought-after opinions are shared on a near-daily, sometimes nearhourly, basis.238 Thus, not only should social media be considered
230

See id. at 1735.
See id. at 1738.
232
See id. at 1733.
233
See id.
234
See id.; see also supra Section I.B.
235
See supra notes 227–34 and accompanying text.
236
See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
237
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735.
238
See generally Trump, supra note 5 (showing December 14th posts from the
President “9h[ours]” ago, “7h[ours]” ago, “4h[ours]” ago, “3h[ours]” ago, and similarly
frequent posts throughout December 14th, 13th, 12th, 11th, 9th, 8th, 7th, 6th, etc.).
231
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public fora, they should be considered the most important public
fora of our time.
While social media generally should be considered one of the
most important public fora of our time—so much so that states
cannot enact laws to make blanket prohibitions of their use, even
when directed at sex offenders and commercial spaces239—that
does not necessarily mean that individual social media accounts
are themselves public fora. Private entities acting in their personal,
as opposed to professional, capacity are not subject to viewpoint
discrimination claims if they block other social media users for
criticizing them on their social media accounts.240 This is because a
First Amendment freedom of speech claim can only be brought
against the government (state or federal)—the entities the First
Amendment was meant to protect us from.241 Only the
government, or public entities and individuals acting under the
color of law, which attributes government action to private persons
working in their official public capacity—specifically, only color
of state law242—can be liable for free speech restrictions on access
to social media.243
Just as private persons acting in their individual capacity are
free to restrict access to their social media, so too can social media
websites themselves become “private,” as they are not open for
public access or comment.244 For example, the Author’s Facebook
239

See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738.
See Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976).
241
Id.
242
Remember, color of federal law claims may only be brought under the Fourth
Amendment. See supra notes 189–93 and accompanying text. Meanwhile, federal
constitutional viewpoint discrimination claims are only brought under the First
Amendment because they deal with restrictions of speech. See supra Section I.B.
243
See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 513.
244
Users of the social media website Facebook, for example, can block users from
viewing specific social media activity like shared pictures, websites, or messages. See
When I Post Something, How Do I Choose Who Can See It?, FAQ Question of Selecting
an Audience for Stuff You Share, Section of Basic Privacy Settings & Tools, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/325807937506242/ [https://perma.cc/S72Y-UJBW] (last
visited Feb. 2, 2017) (explaining how Facebook users can use the “audience selector
tool” to choose between making certain aspects of their social media activity “public” or
“private”). Or, they can make the entire account invisible to those they do not want to see
it. See Who Can Search for Me?, FAQ Question of Control Who Can Find You,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/1718866941707011/?helpref=hc_fnav
240
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account is “private” both in the sense that he does not invite the
general public to comment on his Facebook profile, and that he has
taken affirmative steps to block the general public from even
viewing it by using Facebook’s privacy settings.245 Most
importantly, though, the Author is not the government or a
government official acting in their governmental capacity. Thus,
viewpoint discrimination claims, and First Amendment claims
more generally, cannot be brought against the Author for how he
manages his personal social media accounts.246
In conclusion, while social media as a whole is increasingly
taking on the functions of news sources247 and may be considered
the most important public fora of our time,248 the social media
accounts of individuals may not serve as public fora—subject to
viewpoint discrimination claims—where the forum belongs to
nongovernment or non-color of law entities,249 nor where the social
media is kept private through account settings.250
B. The President’s Personal Twitter Account Is a Public Forum
What is it about the personal social media accounts of those
who happen to be government officials that makes them so
susceptible to public forum claims? As mentioned earlier, not only
the President, but at least four governors and a county official have
been charged with viewpoint discrimination for blocking
constituents that were critical of them on social media.251 The
answer lies in the ways those public officials hold their social
media accounts out to the public.
Only one case so far has rendered a final judgment recognizing
a public official’s self-expressed personal social media account as
constituting a public forum. That case is Davison v. Loudoun

[https://perma.cc/3CZ8-RXU6] (last visited Feb. 2, 2017) (explaining different ways to
make your profile invisible to others).
245
See supra note 244.
246
See supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text.
247
See Shearer & Gottfried, supra note 217.
248
See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
249
See Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976).
250
See supra notes 244–46 and accompanying text.
251
See supra notes 18–19, 23 and accompanying text.
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County Board of Supervisors.252 In Davison, the Eastern District of
Virginia relied on Fourth Circuit jurisprudence in coming to its
decision that the defendant’s self-expressed personal social media
account served as a public forum.253 As the court noted, the Fourth
Circuit had already suggested that governments can create Internet
public fora by creating a “website that includes a ‘chat room or
bulletin board in which private viewers could express opinions or
post information,’ or that otherwise ‘invite[s] or allow[s] private
persons to publish information or their positions.’”254 The court
pointed to the following Facebook post in finding that Randall had
affirmatively solicited the speech and viewpoints of
her constituents:
Everyone, could you do me a favor. I really want to
hear from ANY Loudoun citizen on ANY issues,
request, criticism, compliment, or just your
thoughts. However, I really try to keep back and
forth conversations (as opposed to one time
information items such as road closures) on my
county Facebook page (Chair Phyllis J. Randall) or
County
email
(Phllis.randall@loudoun.gov).
Having back and forth constituent conversations are
Foiable (FOIA) so if you could reach out to me on
these mediums that would be appreciated. Thanks
much, Phyllis[.]255

252

267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017). Note that another case was decided earlier in
the same court, with the same plaintiff, which also recognized a public official’s social
media account to be a public forum. See Davison v. Plowman, No. 1:16CV180
(JCC/IDD), 2017 WL 105984, at *3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2017). However, unlike in
Davison, the public official at issue in Plowman: (1) banned the plaintiff from his official
Commonwealth Attorney’s Facebook page, and (2) expressly admitted that the page was
subject to a county social media policy that intended the Facebook page to serve as a
limited public forum. See id. at *1, 3. Conversely, the defendant in Davison made clear
that she considered her Facebook to be personal, not official. See Davison, 267 F. Supp.
3d at 711 (“Defendant contends that her ‘Chair Phyllis J. Randall’ Facebook page is
merely a personal website that she may do with as she pleases.”).
253
See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716.
254
Id. (quoting Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 284
(4th Cir. 2008)).
255
Id. (quoting defendant).
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The court concluded, based on the above statement, that the
defendant-official’s deliberate designation of her Facebook page as
a space for communication for use by the public was more than
enough to transform it into a public forum.256 As such, even though
the Facebook page was, allegedly, intended to be personal, it was
nonetheless rendered a public forum of the county and thus subject
to viewpoint discrimination claims.257
Interestingly, the President has done the same, if not more so,
than the defendant-official in Davison, to open his
@realDonaldTrump Twitter account to the public, and to treat it as
a government tool. In the pending Southern District of New York
lawsuit against the President, both parties jointly stipulated to facts
pointing towards the conclusion that the President had designated
his personal Twitter account a public forum.258 A few of the more
pertinent stipulated facts were: (1) the President had used his
@realDonaldTrump Twitter account to communicate and interact
with his constituents about his administration since his
inauguration;259 (2) the President, “on occasion,” communicated
about issues “not directly related” to his official government work
as President;260 (3) the President’s personal Twitter account was
“generally accessible to the public at large” with no limiting
criteria;261 (4) the President did not use any protective measures
(such as privacy settings) to protect any of his tweets, therefore
anyone could view them, even without being logged in to Twitter,
and anyone could subscribe to get updates from the account;262 (5)
the President had no rule or statement on form or subject matter of

256

Id.
See id.
258
See Stipulation, supra note 22, at 12.
259
Id.
260
Id. (emphasis added). Notably, that the President uses his personal account “on
occasion” to discuss issues not directly related to his official government business
indicates that the primary discussions on his account are in fact directly related to his
official government business. See id. In fact, this is essentially what the language
supported by the immediately preceding footnote in this Note is stating. See supra note
259 and accompanying text.
261
Stipulation, supra note 22, at 13
262
Id.
257
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speech to limit replies to his tweets;263 (6) earlier in the year, on
July 2, 2017, the President tweeted (i.e., published a message)264
from his personal Twitter account that his social media use was
“MODERN DAY PRESIDENTIAL[,]” while, a month earlier, the
former White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer declared at a
press conference that tweets from the President were “official
statements by the President of the United States”;265 (7) Dan
Scavino, Social Media Director of the White House, promoted the
President’s personal Twitter account (“@realDonaldTrump”), the
President’s official government Twitter account (“@POTUS”), and
the White House’s Twitter account (“@WhiteHouse”), as equal
channels that the President uses to communicate “directly with
you, the American people!”;266 (8) the White House’s Twitter
account description stated that Twitter users should follow the
President’s official government Twitter account, as well as his
personal Twitter account, to get the latest news on his
administration;267 and (9) messages from his official government
Twitter account were “frequently” reposted from his personal
Twitter account.268 The White House even once directed the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to the President’s
“statement” on Twitter as an official White House Record.269 Thus,
not only has the President had his Twitter posts self-described—or
at least ratified—as being official, his posts are even referred to for
use by House of Representatives Committees to further
intragovernmental communications.270
Also stipulated by both parties was that the President used his
personal Twitter account “multiple times a day” to announce,
promote, and defend his policies, legislative agenda, official
263

Id. This means the President’s Twitter account is likely a designated public forum,
rather than a limited one, although the distinction is moot in performing a viewpoint
discrimination analysis because viewpoint discrimination is prohibited in all public fora.
See supra Section I.B.
264
See Strickland & Chandler, supra note 13 (defining “tweets”).
265
Stipulation, supra note 22, at 13.
266
Id.
267
Id. at 13–14.
268
Id. at 14.
269
See id.
270
See id.
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decisions, and state visits.271 He also “engage[d]” with foreign
leaders on the account.272 “[O]n occasion” he would make
statements that did not relate to his official capacity as President.
Finally, he announced official White House business on his
personal Twitter account before other official channels.273
It is difficult to imagine a more public social media account
than the President’s Twitter account. As both parties stipulate, the
number of followers—the people receiving his latest Twitter
posts—is nearly equal to that of his “official” @POTUS and
@WhiteHouse Twitter accounts combined.274 Of these, the only
accounts without access are those the President has blocked.275 The
most enlightening stipulation, though, was the first listed. Namely,
that “President Trump has used the @realDonaldTrump account as
a channel for communicating and interacting with the public about
his administration.”276 This fact alone, stipulated to by both parties,
means that unless a court is completely unwilling to view public
fora in a social media context, the @realDonaldTrump account
squarely falls within the definition of a designated public forum.277
With Davison being the only case of its kind thus far, it is
difficult to say with any certainty whether other courts outside the
Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction will agree with the outcome in
Davison. Regardless, for the time being, under the Davison test,278
and most likely under the Fourth Circuit,279 the President’s Twitter
account has, for all intents and purposes, been rendered a public
forum. And if nothing else, it certainly fits the definition of one.

271

See id.
See id.
273
See id.
274
See id. at 13 (“The account has 35 million followers—16 million more than
@POTUS and 21 million more than @WhiteHouse—as of the filing of this
Stipulation.”).
275
See id.
276
See id. at 12.
277
See supra Section I.B.2.
278
See Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716
(E.D. Va. 2017).
279
See Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 284 (4th Cir. 2008).
272

556

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:511

C. The President Discriminates Against Protectable Viewpoints
on Twitter
Even assuming, arguendo, the President’s Twitter account
constitutes a public forum, does the President violate the First
Amendment when banning constituents from his social
media account?
As discussed below, the answer largely depends on color of
law doctrine—namely, the totality of the circumstances must
indicate that the government official’s actions with respect to
blocking a constituent arose out of public, not personal,
circumstances.280 This same test, expressed another way, is that the
government official’s apparently private actions must have a
“sufficiently close nexus” with the government so as to be “fairly
treated as” the actions of “the [government] itself.”281 This makes
sense given that the purpose for the constitutional freedom of
speech is to protect from government, not personal, abuses.282
Thus, claims for viewpoint discrimination, which fall under the
First Amendment freedom of speech, to have merit, must persuade
courts that the government, not the individual, is the entity acting
when violating plaintiffs’ rights.283
This conundrum is exactly what the color of law doctrine is
supposed to answer.284 It is important to note that both the state
and federal color of law doctrines are normally unnecessary to
bring a claim against the government for constitutional
violations.285 However, when a plaintiff is trying to show that a
specific individual’s actions should be interpreted as the
government’s, especially when those actions relate to the specific
individual’s personal social media, the color of law doctrine must
fill the inferential gap.286 The perfect example of this is, once
280

See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 712 (citing Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516,
523 (4th Cir. 2003)).
281
Id. (quoting Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 523).
282
See supra notes 56–114 and accompanying text.
283
See Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976).
284
See supra Section I.C.2.
285
The color of law doctrine is one way of getting at government constitutional
violations in the civil rights context when the violator was an individual acting on behalf
of the government. See supra Section I.C.2.
286
See supra Section I.C.2.
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again, the Davison case. The Davison case is particularly valuable
in that it lays out a number of factors to consider when determining
whether a social media account is subject to color of state law
doctrine, and by extension, viewpoint discrimination under the
First Amendment.287
In pointing out the Chair of the Loudoun County Board of
Supervisor’s efforts to “swathe the ‘Chair Phyllis J. Randall’
Facebook page in the trappings of her office,” weighing entirely
towards finding applicable color of state law, the court pointed to
the following aspects of her social media account: (1) the title of
the account page included her official government title; (2) the
account was listed as a government official; (3) the account
included her official government contact information; (4) the
account listed the web address of her official government website;
(5) most of her posts were expressly directed at her constituents;
(6) she had submitted posts on behalf of the governing body she
belonged to; (7) she asked her constituents to post on her account
for “back and forth constituent conversations”; and (8) her posts
from the account had a strong tendency towards matters related to
her official office.288 Each of these factors weighed towards a
finding that the defendant-official had run the social media account
in her professional government, rather than personal/private,
capacity.289 This in turn opened her up to color of state law
doctrine and viewpoint discrimination claims, specifically because
she had run the social media account as a forum for her
constituents while representing the county government, and while
doing so, censored one of those constituents for criticizing how
that government was run.290
The court noted other aspects and circumstances playing into
the analysis, particularly in the context of determining whether the
official’s decision to ban the plaintiff-constituent arose out of
“public, not personal, circumstances.”291 They are: (9) the impetus,
287

See Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 712–14
(E.D. Va. 2017).
288
See id. at 714.
289
See id.
290
See id.
291
See id. at 713 (quoting Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 524 (4th Cir. 2003)).
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purpose, and timing for creating the social media account; (10)
whether the account was used as a tool for governance; (11)
whether government resources were used to support the account;
and (12) whether and how often official publications from her or
his office promoted or referenced the official’s account.292
Finally, in noting private aspects of the official’s social media
account, the Eastern District of Virginia pointed to: (13) whether
the official’s enumerated duties included maintenance of a social
media account; (14) whether the account would revert to the
governing body when the official leaves office; (15) whether
government-issued electronic devices were used to post to the
social media account; and (16) whether and how much the
official’s social media activity took place outside of her or his
office and normal working hours.293
By comparing the Stipulation of Facts294 with the factors
above, one can safely conclude that the President’s Twitter account
weighs towards a finding of acting under color of law for most of
those factors.295 One can say with a fair degree of certainty that,
using the President’s own stipulated to facts: (1) his Twitter posts,
and by extension his Twitter account—which itself is essentially a
collection of official Twitter posts that people comment on—are
official (i.e., governmental), rather than personal;296 (2) the account
serves as a designated public forum for constituents to
“communicat[e] and interact[] with the public about his
administration;”297 and (3) he banned constituents from that public
forum on the basis of their criticism of him (i.e., their adverse
viewpoints).298 The President, if he can be linked in his official
capacity to the public nature of his personal Twitter account,
through another mechanism than the color of law doctrine, violates
292

See id.
See id. at 712.
294
See generally Stipulation, supra note 22 (laying out uncontested facts both plaintiffs
and defendants agree to).
295
See supra notes 259–68 and accompanying text. Factors not implicated by the
sample of stipulated facts listed above are all mostly addressed in the Knight Institute
stipulation. See generally Stipulation, supra note 22.
296
See supra notes 259–68 and accompanying text.
297
Stipulation, supra note 22, at 12
298
See id. at 1.
293
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the First Amendment freedom of speech when blocking
constituents from his Twitter account for their adverse
viewpoints—at least in every situation where an exception, such as
speech unworthy of protection (e.g., fighting words, etc.) is
not at play.299
It should be noted that because the color of law claims are
based on the totality of the circumstances, the factors addressed
above are neither dispositive nor exclusive to the issue of whether
an official committed viewpoint discrimination in banning a
constituent from their personal social media account.300 Further
complicating the issue is the fact that the above factors were used
in a color of state law analysis,301 whereas the President is a federal
public official. This means the President’s actions would have to
be analyzed under color of federal law, rather than color of state
law, doctrine. In other words, the President cannot be held liable
under either theory of the color of law doctrine because color of
federal law only applies to cases involving a Fourth, rather than
First, Amendment violation.302
In sum, a color of law doctrine claim will fail against the
President where it succeeded against the defendant-official in
Davison.303 While color of state law doctrine provides an answer to
viewpoint discrimination claims against state and local officials
when banning constituents from their personal social media
accounts, color of federal law doctrine simply does not afford the
same protection when confronting federal officials.304 As already
mentioned, however, the President’s Twitter account would qualify
as a public forum, which means other avenues may exist to find the
President liable for viewpoint discrimination claims on his
personal Twitter account.305 It is just that the color of law
299

See supra Sections I.A–B and notes 59–68.
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mechanism from the Davison analysis will be inapplicable when
the case goes to trial.306
What may remain applicable from Davison as a pioneering
case to the Knight Institute claim, however, are the various factors
the court looked to when deciding whether the forum was of a
pubic, rather than private, character.307 As discussed in Section I.B,
if the government opens a forum to the general public for speech,
as the President did with his personal Twitter account,308 then that
forum is subject to viewpoint discrimination claims.309
III. PROPOSAL
The President’s explicit use of his personal Twitter account for
official purposes largely resolved the conundrum addressed in Part
II of this Note because the account is self-avowedly an official
government forum.310 Nonetheless, absent explicit evidence of
using social media for official government use, the reality is that
the color of federal law doctrine remains inapplicable to viewpoint
discrimination. As discussed above, viewpoint discrimination
claims for social media require: (1) a public forum; (2) a
viewpoint-based restriction on use of the public forum; and (3) a

306

See generally supra Section I.C.2 (describing both color of law doctrines and how
color of state law doctrine was relied on in the Davison analysis).
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See supra notes 288–93 and accompanying text. While most of the Davison factors
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See Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d
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government defendant or a government official acting within the
trappings of their office.311
In Davison, the third element above was found through an
application of the color of state law doctrine.312 By holding that the
Chairwoman in Davison had acted under color of state law, the
court found that the constitutional viewpoint discrimination claim
could stick because the Chairwoman had acted in the role of her
office.313 Without a comparable doctrine available for First
Amendment claims—given that, the color of federal law doctrine
only supports causes of action under the Fourth Amendment314—
what options are available to viewpoint discrimination claimants
seeking redress against federal public officials who are not as
candid as the President concerning their official use of their social
media accounts?
Section III.A discusses U.S. District Judge Naomi Reice
Buchwald’s recommendation concerning how to resolve the
dispute in Trump. Section III.B examines Twitter’s Terms and
Conditions for any information that might be useful to a court in
determining how to address the question presented by Part II.
Section III.C discusses the existence of social media best practices
disseminated by federal agencies. Finally, Section III.D discusses
the merits of treating the relationship between an elected official
and his or her constituents as a fiduciary relationship, such as
between lawyer and client.
A. Judge Buchwald’s Recommendation in Trump
According to Judge Buchwald, who heard arguments from
lawyers for both the President and Knight Institute in Trump, the
President should “mute” rather than “block” critical posts he finds
unwelcome.315 When a Twitter user “mutes” another Twitter user,
311
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the other user’s messages are hidden from the account holder
without actually blocking or stopping the muted person’s access to
view or post to the account.316 Blocking the account, on the other
hand, prevents the blocked user from viewing posts, accessing the
account, seeing basic information associated with the account, such
as the list of people and posts the account is associated with, and
information about people following the account for updates.317 If
the President muted an account, then, the muted constituent could
still participate in political discourse in that forum, just without
being seen or heard by the President himself.318
For example, if the President decided to mute a constituent on
Twitter, the constituent could still follow the President’s Twitter
account, post replies to the President’s posts, and read what is on
the President’s account.319 Thus, the constituent can still participate
in communicating with and viewing the President’s account.320
However, unbeknownst to the constituent, the President cannot see
anything posted by the constituent once the constituent has been
muted.321 The constituent’s post is still there for the world to see,
but not for the President to see.322 However, if the President had
blocked the constituent instead, the constituent would not be able
to view the President’s account, post replies to the President’s
posts, or follow the President’s account for updates.323 Thus, the
constituent would be effectively locked out of perhaps one of the
most personal and frequent utilities the leader of the nation, the
President, uses to communicate with and update the public.324

255f8d9?utm_campaign=SocialFlow&utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=AP
[https://perma.cc/LDK5-H98L].
316
See How to Mute Accounts on Twitter, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://help.twitter.com/
en/using-twitter/twitter-mute [https://perma.cc/9YH3-9JF7] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
317
See How to Control Your Twitter Experience, TWITTER HELP CTR.,
https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/control-your-twitter-experience
[https://perma.cc/8S5F-59YS] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
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Muting may appease both the critical constituent, who wants
participate in political discourse on the President’s account, and the
President, who does not want to see the constituent’s criticism.325
This is, assuming of course, the constituent is trying to reach
people other than the President on the account, and that the
President is more concerned with himself not seeing the message,
rather than the general public with access to his account.326 Such a
solution settles the constitutional claims regardless, however, as
constituents do not have the right to be seen or heard by the
President, and the President cannot stop users from hearing
another’s viewpoint in a public forum (in this case, his
Twitter account).327
It remains to be seen whether, after consulting with their
clients, lawyers for either side will accept Judge Buchwald’s
recommendation and settle the case, as the judge hopes.328 If not,
Judge Buchwald has cautioned that both parties may receive an
outcome they will not like.329 Unfortunately, Judge Buchwald’s
recommendation sounds more like an ultimatum than a promise to
clear up a confusing and new area of the law.330 What if “muting”
is not an option on social media, or what if a federal official
refuses to mute, and continues to block? What is the appropriate
outcome then? It seems an answer unfriendly to both parties in
Trump may be forthcoming should the parties refuse to settle on
the judge’s recommendation.331
B. Twitter’s Terms and Conditions
What does Twitter have to say about all this? According to
Twitter’s Terms of Service, if any “federal, state, or local
government entity in the United States using the Services in [its]
325
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official capacity” cannot legally accept Twitter’s terms, then those
terms do not apply to those entities.332 Any lawsuits brought
relating to those terms are instead governed by U.S. federal law
where applicable, and California state law where inapplicable.333
Notably, Twitter is aware of the distinction between government
entities using its services in an official versus an unofficial
capacity.334 It is thus false to assume that just because the platform
is Twitter, conduct by a government official on that platform is
somehow less official—at least according to Twitter.335 Further,
Twitter’s terms that might cause or enable a government official to
commit viewpoint discrimination on Twitter are rendered
inapplicable because these do not apply when the government
cannot legally accept them; as the government cannot legally
accept viewpoint discrimination in a governmental public forum.336
In sum, the government cannot hypothetically cite to Twitter’s
terms as a reason to break the law, nor as a reason to doubt the
official nature of the posts by government officials on there.337
Twitter’s Terms of Service also states:
You understand that by using the Services, you may
be exposed to Content that might be offensive,
harmful, inaccurate or otherwise inappropriate . . . .
All Content is the sole responsibility of the person
who originated such Content. We may not monitor
or control the Content posted via the Services and,
we cannot take responsibility for such Content.338
This indicates that Twitter also claims no responsibility when it
comes to monitoring or controlling content others might find
offensive.339 Thus, Twitter claims no obligation to police what

332
If You Live in the United States, Section of Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/en/tos [https://perma.cc/9C5Z-TZW6] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018)
(emphasis added).
333
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people say on the President’s Twitter account, nor an obligation to
police when the President blocks content.340
Overall, Twitter has an apparent laissez-faire (hands-off) role
in how government officials use their services, so long as the
government is not breaking the law while using them.341 Under
these terms, Twitter disclaims responsibility from monitoring
posted content, including what constituents might post on a
government official’s Twitter account, or what posts might be
blocked by that same Twitter account.342 Twitter also
acknowledges that government entities might use their services in
their official capacity.343 These insights from Twitter may be
useful to courts considering these questions from a contractual
point of view: whether government officials, including the
President, can break the law when using its services; whether
Twitter should stay out of such a dispute; and whether Twitter can
be used for official government purposes. After all, Twitter’s
Terms and Conditions, its contract with its users, certainly states
that all three are possible.344
C. Social Media Best Practices from Federal Agencies
Several federal agencies have already disseminated their own
best practices as related to social media use by their employees in
relation to the agency. For example, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention has a variety of materials that govern its
social media presence, specifically through its employees.345 They
have a standalone Twitter guide and a standalone Facebook guide,
in addition to their general social media policy.346 The social media
policy goes into great length about what is considered official
social media behavior taken on behalf of the agency itself, and
what is personal social media behavior, as well as the agency’s
340
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expectations regarding the two.347 The same holds true of the
social media policies for the Food and Drug Administration,348 the
Department of Energy,349 the Office of Personnel Management,350
the Department of the Interior,351 and the General
Service Administration.352
While this Note has not reviewed the full list of federal agency
social media policies available,353 the above sample reflects that
federal agencies are aware of the important distinction between
official versus personal use of social media by their employees.354
Each of the policies surveyed above go to great pains to make clear
what they find constitutes acceptable official versus personal social
media activity by their employees.355
The White House might well consider implementing its own
official social media policy—one that prescribes what amounts to
official versus personal social media activity by its employees,
including the President and those that may tweet on his behalf.
However, while such a policy might clear up what the government
views pertaining to its social media, it is unlikely to clear up the
law on whether—should an official fail to follow the policy—a
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federal official will be held liable for viewpoint discrimination
committed on their social media account.
D. Principal-Agent Relationship
Finally, one answer is to recognize an exception allowing a
new use of color of federal law doctrine. The issue for the public is
how to recognize when federal public officials are acting within
the trappings of their office under allegedly personal
circumstances, and how to hold the government accountable for
when those public officials abuse their office to abrogate the
constitutional rights of others under the guise of personal, not
public, pretenses.
In pondering these issues, consider the duties lawyers owe to
prospective clients under section 14 of the Third Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers (the “Restatement”),356 stating:
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when: (1)
a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent
that the lawyer provide legal services for the person;
and either (a) the lawyer manifests to the person
consent to do so; or (b) the lawyer fails to manifest
lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the person reasonably
relies on the lawyer to provide the services; or (2) a
tribunal with power to do so appoints the lawyer to
provide the services.357
In a comment dedicated to the rationale behind this rule, the
Restatement makes clear that lawyers should be “held to
responsibility of representation when the client reasonably relies
on the existence of the relationship.”358 It is this aspect of the rule
in particular that could provide a solution to the issue of
ambiguous federal public official activity in cases where the line
between official and personal action is murky.
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A rule that would address the glaring pocket of absent
protection discussed earlier in this Part might look similar to that
of the Restatement’s section 14:
A federal official acts in their official capacity on
behalf of the government when: (1) a person
manifests to the official the person’s belief that the
official is acting in their official capacity; and either
(a) the official manifests to the person consent that
they are; or (b) the official fails to manifest lack of
consent that they are, and the official knows or
reasonably should know that the person reasonably
relies on the official’s actions as representative of
the government’s; or (2) an agency or branch of
government with power to do so specifies a
circumstance under which the official is deemed to
have acted in their official capacity on behalf of
the government.
Under such a rule, public federal officials are held to their
actions that provoke reasonable reliance from others that they are
indeed acting in their official capacity. Assume the President had
not admitted to using his personal Twitter account for primarily
official purposes. If others reasonably relied on his representation
(though non-explicit) that his personal Twitter account was
official, plaintiffs bringing a viewpoint discrimination claim would
be entitled to rely on the official representation of the account as
governmental, thus opening the doors to a constitutional claim
against the government.
While some might argue that a public official’s relationship
with their constituents is of a different nature than that of a
lawyer’s relationship with their clients—which is admittedly
true—more than a few similarities exist. For one, just as lawyers
are the agents and fiduciaries of their clients,359 so too should
public officials be the fiduciaries of their constituents. It is
axiomatic that public officials are elected by their constituents to
represent their interests in government. It is not a grand leap to
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suggest that such a duty includes an agency relationship, with
constituents acting as the principal.
Judge Posner, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit decision Burdett v. Miller, explained that “[a] fiduciary
duty is the duty of an agent to treat his principal with the utmost
candor, rectitude, care, loyalty, and good faith—in fact to treat the
principal as well as the agent would treat himself.”360 He went on
to explain that “[t]he common law imposes that duty when the
disparity between the parties in knowledge or power relevant to the
performance of an undertaking is so vast that . . . otherwise the
principal would be placing himself at the agent’s mercy.”361 He
provides examples of fiduciary duty, such as a guardian and his
minor ward, or a lawyer and his client.362
Does not a federal public official, an employee of the
government that protects us, owe a duty similar to that of a
fiduciary duty, namely, to treat their electing constituents “with the
utmost candor, rectitude, care, loyalty and good faith”?363 While
many might grouse that federal officials, much less politicians,
have hardly a reputation for their candor and rectitude, loyalty and
good faith, this only provokes a stronger rationale for imposing the
duty in the first place. Lawyers too have hardly the glittering
reputation in popular culture lately, but as Judge Posner pointed
out, the disparity between their knowledge and power and the
client’s in legal matters necessitates that they behave according to
the fiduciary duty.364 Otherwise, a client would be at the lawyer’s
mercy in all legal matters brought to the lawyer’s attention.365
So too is there a large disparity between the power and
knowledge a federal public official has over a constituent’s in
matters of governance and politics. Constituents are at the public
official’s mercy, with little authority and resources to provide
meaningful oversight over, say, a governor or the President. Thus,
this Note suggests that rules should be crafted tightening the
360
361
362
363
364
365
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fiduciary relationship between a federal public official and the
constituents they govern for the constituents’ benefit.
This Note does not have the time nor resources to dig into an
overhaul of political accountability to constituents. Rather, it
merely provides a survey of a range of factors for courts to
consider when taking on a government social media viewpoint
discrimination claim. These factors included the Davison factors
from Section II.C, Judge Buchwald’s recommendation in Section
III.A, Twitter’s Terms and Conditions policy from Section III.B,
the social media best practices for several federal agencies in
Section III.C, and the benefits of treating elected public officials as
the fiduciaries of their constituents discussed in Section III.D.
CONCLUSION
As discussed in the Parts above, the President’s personal social
media account functions as a designated public forum and the
President practiced viewpoint discrimination in maintaining that
forum. Courts will find that the recent Davison decision, while
instructive, uses a method to get at the government action element
of a viewpoint discrimination claim that cannot be applied to the
President. However, a color of law theory is unnecessary in the
context of the President’s Twitter activities, given his defense
team’s stipulation to facts that the President primarily uses his
personal Twitter account for official purposes. Thus, the
President’s personal Twitter account is self-avowedly official,
attributed to his governmental office, and open to constitutional
protection on viewpoint discrimination grounds. It remains,
however, to be seen how the problem in Part II of this Note would
be resolved if the President had not explicitly marked his own
Twitter posts as being official. What would fill the gap in the
Davison color of law analysis? As suggested in Part III of this
Note, there are a variety of sources for courts to look to when
considering a creative solution to this latest problem in free
speech cases.

